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Once regarded as the increasingly obscure specialty of only 
a handful of litigators and law professors, the writ of habeas 
corpus has risen to renewed prominence in the years since 
President George W. Bush announced that the United States 
was launching a war on terror.1 The President’s aggressive 
prosecution of that campaign has led to the incarceration of 
hundreds of individuals, many of whom have not been formally 
charged with any crime and face seemingly indefinite extra-
judicial detention—detention without the review, approval, or 
participation of any court.2 Hoping to win either their freedom 
or an appearance before a judge, many of those detainees have 
tried to secure the remedy that individuals have sought for cen-
turies in the United States and Great Britain when facing 
extrajudicial confinement—the Great Writ.3 The detainees’ pe-
titions for habeas relief have, in turn, forced courts, legislators, 
and scholars to wrestle with profoundly difficult questions con-
cerning the rights of citizens and noncitizens detained by 
American forces at home and abroad4 and the political 
 
 1. Marc Sandalow & Carolyn Lochhead, President Asks Congress for 
Sweeping War Powers, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2001, at A1 (“President Bush 
declared winning the war on terrorism the central focus of his presidency yes-
terday as his administration laid the groundwork for a sweeping military 
campaign.”). 
 2. Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee 
Bill Backed by Bush; Constitutional Challenges Predicted, WASH. POST, Sept. 
29, 2006, at A1 (“Hundreds of . . . detainees have been held for several years 
without trial at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while oth-
ers were held at secret prisons overseas.”); Carl Tobias, Editorial, Overreach-
ing on “Enemy Combatants,” BALT. SUN, Jan. 1, 2006, at A15, available at 
2006 WLNR 107922 (stating that, for several years, the federal government 
held Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, at a navy brig in South Carolina without 
charging him with any crime). 
 3. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS COR-
PUS 12–63 (1980) (discussing the evolution of the writ at English common law 
from a restrictive instrument compelling appearance to a device for securing a 
person’s release from unlawful confinement); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 474 n.6 (1976) (“It is now well established that the phrase ‘habeas corpus’ 
used alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, 
known as the ‘Great Writ.’” (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 
95 (1807))). 
 4. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764–69 (2006) (hold-
ing that § 1005(e)(1) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005), which purported to strip the 
federal courts of power to entertain habeas petitions filed by persons held at 
the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, did not apply to petitions pending at 
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branches’ ability to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
provide the detainees with meaningful relief.5 
While others have grappled with the legality of federal 
extrajudicial confinement, state courts have sat quietly on the 
sidelines. The Supreme Court forced state judges into the role 
of idle spectators nearly 150 years ago, in a pair of cases deal-
ing with efforts by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to free an ab-
olitionist and an unhappy teenaged soldier from federal custo-
dy. Ableman v. Booth6 and Tarble’s Case7 together stand for the 
proposition that state courts cannot grant habeas relief to fed-
 
the time of the statute’s enactment); id. at 2786–98 (holding that a system of 
military commissions established to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay vi-
olated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and various Geneva Conventions); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516–39 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opi-
nion) (finding that citizens may be held as “enemy combatants” but must be 
given an opportunity to contest that designation before an impartial tribunal); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–84 (2004) (holding that, when an alien is not 
a citizen of a country with whom the United States is at war, and that alien is 
extrajudicially held within the United States’ territorial jurisdiction, a federal 
district court can adjudicate the alien’s habeas petition so long as it has juris-
diction over the alien’s custodian); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–42 
(2004) (holding that, when a citizen is detained by American armed forces and 
desires habeas relief, he or she must file the petition in a district having juris-
diction over the petitioner’s immediate custodian, not with the Secretary of 
Defense); Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 174–95 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that it is unconstitutional for the President and the military to indefinitely 
detain, without trial, alien civilians who have lawfully entered the United 
States), reh’g en banc granted, No. 06-7427 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007). 
 5. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 
Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.) (establishing 
a system of military commissions and declaring that no court shall have juris-
diction over a habeas petition filed by an alien detainee who has been properly 
detained by the United States as an “enemy combatant”); Al-Marri, 487 F.3d 
at 166–73 (stating in dictum that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 might be unconstitutional, but holding that 
the provision did not apply in the case at hand because there had been no de-
termination by the United States that the President’s detention of Al-Marri as 
an “enemy combatant” was “proper”); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 988–
94 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 does not violate the Constitution), cert. granted, 127 
S. Ct. 3078 (2007); Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in the War 
on Terrorism, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 259, 260–67 (2006) (examining the juris-
diction-stripping provisions of recent antiterrorism legislation). 
 6. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1859) (holding that state courts lack juris-
diction to hear the habeas petition of a person convicted of a federal crime).  
 7. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 (1872) (holding that state courts lack 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the discharge of a person in 
federal custody). 
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eral prisoners, regardless of whether those prisoners have been 
given the benefit of federal judicial proceedings.8 
Although many take issue with the arguments that the 
Court marshaled in support of that proposition,9 the proposi-
tion itself is generally regarded as too widely accepted to be se-
riously questioned. Gerald Neuman contends, for example, that 
changes in federal-state relationships in the wake of the Civil 
War, coupled with “the Supreme Court’s limited capacity to 
correct erroneous state court interpretations of federal law, 
both counsel against reviving state habeas remedies for federal 
prisoners, so long as federal courts stand open to them.”10 Re-
cognizing the forces weighing against it, William Duker sug-
gests that the possibility of state habeas relief for federal de-
tainees might be a question “reserved for the antiquarian.”11 
If the actions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ableman 
and Tarble’s Case had been entirely the product of one state’s 
misguided judiciary, if Congress had granted the federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over federal prisoners’ habeas claims, or 
if the Constitution made it clear that federal prisoners were en-
tirely beyond state judges’ reach, then the possibility of state 
habeas relief for federal extrajudicial detainees might indeed 
stir the imagination of only the most ardent antiquarian. In re-
ality, however, the state courts routinely granted habeas relief 
to federal extrajudicial detainees for half a century.12 The his-
 
 8. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 134–35 (2d ed. 2003) (ex-
plaining that, under Ableman and Tarble’s Case, state courts cannot issue 
“habeas corpus relief to prisoners in the custody of federal officers” (citing  
Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 516; Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 397)). 
 9. See DUKER, supra note 3, at 154–55 (arguing that the supremacy of 
the Federal Constitution should not prohibit state court judges from hearing 
the habeas petitions of federal prisoners because state court judges, like fed-
eral judges, must support the Constitution); YACKLE, supra note 8, at 135–36 
(arguing that the Tarble Court ignored “the conventional understanding that 
Congress might never have created the lower federal courts and might have 
relied, instead, on state courts to police the system”); Michael G. Collins, Ar-
ticle III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 39, 101–02 (noting that if the Tarble Court correctly held that the 
Constitution forbade state court jurisdiction in habeas cases involving federal 
prisoners and Congress had not created the lower federal courts, there would 
be no forum for federal prisoners to seek redress for illegal detention). 
 10. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS 
v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 597 (2002). 
 11. DUKER, supra note 3, at 155. 
 12. E.g., Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227, 227 (1836); 
State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194, 196 (1841); United States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill 16, 
18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Commonwealth ex rel. Webster v. Fox, 7 Pa. 336, 337–
38 (1847). 
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torical record provides no convincing evidence that Congress 
ever rejected the strong presumption of concurrent state and 
federal jurisdiction over those detainees’ habeas claims.13 
Moreover, the Constitution not only addresses the matter of 
state habeas relief for federal extrajudicial detainees, but guar-
antees that Congress cannot suspend state courts’ power to 
grant those detainees the appropriate relief except in the most 
extraordinary of circumstances.14 This Article contends that it 
is time to allow state judges to leave their seats on the sidelines 
and take their constitutionally assured role as a primary pro-
tector of individuals’ freedom. 
To demonstrate that Ableman and Tarble’s Case were not 
provoked merely by a few renegade judges in Wisconsin, Part I 
of this Article tells the story of a long-forgotten time when state 
courts frequently granted habeas relief to individuals being 
held by federal officials without judicial process. In Ableman, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court admittedly ventured into troub-
lesome territory when it tried to free a man who had already 
been tried, convicted, and sentenced by a federal court.15 But 
when the Wisconsin high court retreated to more familiar 
ground a few years later in Tarble’s Case, attempting to provide 
relief to a boy being extrajudicially detained by federal military 
officials, the United States Supreme Court sweepingly declared 
that state judges should regard federal prisoners as entirely off 
limits.16 
Part II begins by noting the prevailing criticism of the ar-
gument that the Court advanced in support of its conclusions in 
Ableman and Tarble’s Case. It then rejects the substitute ar-
gument around which scholars have coalesced in their effort to 
rationalize the Court’s holdings in those two cases—namely, 
that when Congress authorized federal courts to hear federal 
 
 13. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 457–508 (1971) 
(detailing the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and making no mention of 
debates on whether to make federal jurisdiction over habeas cases exclusive); 
WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ACT OF 
1789 passim (1990) (same). 
 14. See DUKER, supra note 3, at 135 (“[T]he debates in the federal and 
state conventions, the location of the habeas clause, and the contemporary 
commentary support the thesis that the habeas clause was designed to restrict 
Congressional power to suspend state habeas for federal prisoners.”). 
 15. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 510 (1859). 
 16. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 410–11 (1872). 
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prisoners’ habeas claims in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it impli-
citly preempted state courts’ jurisdiction. 
Drawing from the work of William Duker and others, Part 
III contends that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause was in-
tended to guarantee both individuals and the states that, ab-
sent extraordinary circumstances, federal leaders could not 
strip state courts of their power to provide habeas relief to per-
sons being extrajudicially detained by federal authorities. Part 
III concludes by arguing that it is not too late to honor the Con-
stitution’s promise. 
I.  THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE HABEAS RELIEF FOR 
FEDERAL PRISONERS   
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, it was 
widely believed—among state courts, federal officials, and legal 
commentators alike—that state courts had the power to pro-
vide relief to individuals being extrajudicially detained, regard-
less of whether the federal government was the sovereign re-
sponsible for the confinement.17 State judges believed that their 
power to provide such relief was an indispensable feature of the 
states’ sovereignty.18 The Supreme Court abruptly rejected that 
conception of state courts’ power in 1872.19 Rather than distin-
guish between judicial and extrajudicial federal detentions and 
declare that state courts can intervene only in instances of the 
latter—the distinction that most state courts had made for half 
a century—the Court declared that state courts can never 
award habeas relief to individuals in federal custody, no matter 
what the circumstances.20 
A. FROM THE NATION’S BIRTH TO THE WISCONSIN REBELLION: 
THE ASCENDANCY OF STATE COURTS’ POWERS 
In section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress autho-
rized federal courts and judges to award habeas relief to federal 
prisoners.21 In the eyes of many early Americans, however, the 
 
 17. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) at 227; Dimick, 12 N.H. at 196; Wyngall, 
5 Hill at 18; Fox, 7 Pa. at 337–38; ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT 
OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 166 (Albany, 
W.C. Little & Co. 1858). 
 18. E.g., State v. Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 639, 643–44 (N.J. 1819); Olmsted’s 
Case, Brightly 9, 15 (Pa. Ct. Nisi Prius 1809). 
 19. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 411. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (authorizing 
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federal government was not the primary protector of citizens’ 
freedom.22 Before the federal courts arrived on the scene, state 
courts had long exercised their common-law power to issue the 
Great Writ in cases of unlawful confinement.23 In this and oth-
er areas, citizens principally looked to the states, and not the 
fledgling federal government, when they needed a sovereign’s 
help.24 After all, between the late 1700s and the mid-1800s, 
most government services of any significance were provided by 
state and local officials,25 while citizens’ relationships with fed-
eral officials were often “characterized by distance and dis-
trust.”26 When suffering restraints at the hands of federal au-
thorities, therefore, citizens often turned not to the courts of 
the new and unfamiliar sovereign—a sovereign that many 
feared would abuse its power in oppressive ways27—but rather 
 
federal courts and judges to award habeas relief to federal prisoners “for the 
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment”). The 1789 Act did not 
authorize federal courts to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. See Ex parte 
Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845). Congress lifted that limitation in the 
wake of the Civil War. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–
86. 
 22. See In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (arguing that 
the state court has an “indispensable duty” to protect the liberty of its citizens 
from illegal confinement); In re Bryan, 60 N.C. (Win.) 1, 28 (1863) (stating 
that a state has no higher duty than “protecting all her citizens in the full and 
free enjoyment of life, liberty, and private property”). 
 23. See Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, 
and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (“At the 
very beginning of the nineteenth century, most state courts continued to draw 
their authority to issue the writ from their common-law powers which pre-
ceded independence.”); Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776–
1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 251–55 (1965) (describing early state courts’ 
common-law and statutory habeas powers). 
 24. See Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s 
Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 349 (2003) (stating that, in the 
nation’s first decades, “responsibility for securing the public good [fell] primar-
ily on the states’ shoulders”). 
 25. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM 
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION 354 (1984) 
(“[Americans’] firm loyalties began at home and extended from the community 
through its surrounding area no farther than the state, the most distant unit 
that actually fed their enterprises and influenced their local environments.”); 
Todd E. Pettys, Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1353, 
1383 (2006) (“In the early and mid[-]1800s, the federal government struck the 
smallest of profiles in citizens’ daily lives . . . .”). 
 26. MELINDA LAWSON, PATRIOT FIRES: FORGING A NEW AMERICAN NA-
TIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR NORTH 10 (2002). 
 27. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1781–1788, at 255–56 (1961) (noting that many agreed to sup-
port the Constitution only when promised that the new national government’s 
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to the courts of the sovereign that had already earned the 
people’s confidence and loyalty. 
Two of the earliest reported cases involving federal detai-
nees seeking state habeas relief, both decided in 1809, illu-
strate the state courts’ willingness to take jurisdiction of such 
claims. In In re Roberts,28 the father of sixteen-year-old Ema-
nuel Roberts filed a habeas petition with Chief Judge Joseph 
Nicholson, of Maryland’s Sixth Judicial District.29 Roberts’s fa-
ther alleged that his son “had been seized, and forcibly carried 
on board the brig Syren,” a United States naval vessel that had 
been sent to Baltimore to recruit crew members.30 Chief Judge 
Nicholson wrote that, when he first read the petition, he felt 
“no hesitation . . . in granting a writ which every citizen illegal-
ly held in custody has a right to demand.”31 He pointed out 
that, in two prior cases, he had readily granted habeas relief to 
private citizens who had been arrested by federal military offi-
cials on suspicion of treason; after determining that “there was 
not a shadow of proof against them,” the chief judge had or-
dered them discharged.32 In Roberts’s case, however, he con-
cluded that the young man had voluntarily enlisted in the navy 
and had accepted payment for his first three months of ser-
vice.33 Although Chief Judge Nicholson acknowledged that 
state law generally did not recognize contracts made by minors, 
he denied the request for habeas relief, concluding that Roberts 
was old enough to serve in the navy: “The history of our own 
times has taught us that young men under twenty-one years of 
age, if not the best, are certainly not inferior to any other sol-
diers in the world.”34 
 
powers would be reined in by a series of amendments); DAVID J. SIEMERS, THE 
ANTIFEDERALISTS: MEN OF GREAT FAITH AND FORBEARANCE 223–25 (2003) 
(explaining that, although the Antifederalists ultimately accepted the Consti-
tution, they worked hard to ensure that the national government’s powers re-
mained limited). 
 28. 2 AM. L.J. 192 (Md. Dist. Ct. 1809). 
 29. Id. at 192–93. 
 30. Id. at 193–94. 
 31. Id. at 193. 
 32. Id. at 195–96. The two cases to which Chief Judge Nicholson referred 
are unreported. 
 33. Id. at 193. 
 34. Id. at 195; accord Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Binn. 487, 492 (Pa. 
1812) (Tilghman, C.J.) (voting to deny relief to a seventeen-year-old boy seek-
ing release from the navy, because, inter alia, boys under the age of twenty-
one not only could be of great service to their country, but also could benefit 
from acquiring “practical knowledge of sea affairs”). 
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In Olmsted’s Case,35 decided in Pennsylvania the same 
year, the courts were faced with a dispute between claimants to 
a monetary award for capturing the Active, an enemy British 
vessel. Gideon Olmsted claimed that he and his friends were 
entitled to the prize: after having been taken onboard the Ac-
tive as prisoners of war, they had overpowered the British crew, 
locked them in a cabin, and set sail for Philadelphia.36 The 
state of Pennsylvania, however, claimed that it was entitled to 
a portion of the prize because the crew of a Pennsylvania-
owned ship had escorted the Active into port.37 A state jury di-
vided the prize between the claimants,38 and a portion of Penn-
sylvania’s share of the proceeds soon found its way into the 
hands of two women named Elizabeth Sergeant and Esther 
Waters.39 A federal admiralty panel later overturned the jury’s 
verdict and ordered all of the proceeds paid to Olmsted and his 
companions.40 When Sergeant and Waters refused to pay, a 
federal district court ordered federal officials to take them into 
custody.41 The United States Marshalls were able to capture 
Sergeant but not Waters.42 Once imprisoned, Sergeant sought 
habeas relief from Chief Justice William Tilghman, of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, arguing that the federal panel 
had lacked jurisdiction.43 Chief Justice Tilghman made it clear 
that, in the appropriate circumstances, he would not hesitate to 
issue the writ on behalf of a person in federal custody.44 When 
the federal government exceeds its powers, he reasoned, 
the independence of the states, and the peace of the union demand 
that the state courts should . . . give redress. There is no law which 
forbids it; their oath of office exacts it, and, if they do not, what course 
is to be taken? We must be reduced to the miserable extremity of op-
posing force to force, and arraying citizen against citizen; for it is in 
vain to expect that the states will submit to manifest and flagrant 
 
 35. Brightly 9 (Pa. Ct. Nisi Prius 1809). 
 36. Id. at 19–20. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 11, 20. 
 39. Id. at 12, 18, 20. Sergeant and Waters were the daughters of David 
Rittenhouse, Pennsylvania’s treasurer. The state had placed the funds in Rit-
tenhouse’s hands for safekeeping. After Rittenhouse died, the funds passed to 
Sergeant and Waters, his heirs, and the administrators of his estate. Id. at 20. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Id. at 14. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 15. 
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usurpations of power by the United States, if (which God forbid) they 
should ever attempt them.45 
On the merits, however, Chief Justice Tilghman denied 
Sergeant’s petition, concluding that the federal admiralty panel 
had jurisdiction to overrule the state jury’s verdict.46 
One of the few state judges to express any initial doubts 
about state courts’ power to award habeas relief to persons in 
federal custody was New York’s Chief Justice James Kent. In 
1812, the father of seventeen-year-old Jeremiah Ferguson filed 
a habeas petition with the New York Supreme Court of Judica-
ture, alleging that Ferguson had enlisted in the United States 
Army without his father’s consent and that Ferguson was thus 
entitled to be discharged.47 All five of the court’s justices voted 
to deny the petition. Writing solely for himself, Chief Justice 
Kent concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction.48 In his view, 
forcing a minor to remain in the army was a matter over which 
the federal courts possessed exclusive jurisdiction: 
An abuse of the authority of the United States is an offense against 
the United States, and exclusively cognizable in their courts. When 
the state courts have not jurisdiction over the whole subject matter of 
the imprisonment, and when the federal courts have such jurisdic-
tion, by indictment, as well as by habeas corpus, there appears to me 
to be a manifest want of jurisdiction in the case.49 
The chief justice’s colleagues were unwilling to concede ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the federal bench. Declaring himself torn 
between Chief Judge Nicholson’s endorsement of state jurisdic-
tion in In re Roberts and Chief Justice Kent’s opposition to ju-
risdiction in the present case, Justice Smith Thompson con-
cluded that Ferguson’s petition should be rejected on the 
merits, making it unnecessary to “disclaim having jurisdiction, 
in any case, where the imprisonment or restraint is under color 
of the authority of the United States.”50 Justices Ambrose 
Spencer, William Van Ness, and Joseph Yates similarly voted 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 19. 
 47. In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. 239, 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). This was not 
the first time that the New York Supreme Court of Judicature was confronted 
with such a petition. In In re Husted, 1 Johns. Cas. 136, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1799), the court issued elliptical opinions revealing little in the way of facts 
and reasoning. Two justices (including then Justice Kent) voted against grant-
ing habeas relief on the merits; two justices would have granted habeas relief; 
and one justice concluded (on unstated grounds) that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion. See id. 
 48. In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. at 242. 
 49. Id. at 240. 
 50. Id. at 241–42 (Thompson, J., concurring). 
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to reject Ferguson’s petition on the merits, “expressly reserving 
themselves as to the question of jurisdiction.”51 
Chief Justice Kent’s misgivings about coming to the aid of 
federal detainees were short lived. The very next year, officials 
under the command of United States Army General Morgan 
Lewis arrested Samuel Stacy, a private citizen, on suspicion of 
treason.52 When a New York court commissioner issued a ha-
beas writ, instructing General Lewis to bring Stacy to court 
and provide a justification for his detention, General Lewis dis-
ingenuously responded by stating that Stacy was not in his 
custody—Stacy was actually under the control of one of Gener-
al Lewis’s subordinate officers.53 Stacy thus sought an order of 
attachment, by which General Lewis himself would be taken 
into custody if he did not either discharge Stacy or bring him to 
court to justify his continued incarceration.54 Chief Justice 
Kent revealed no hesitation in bringing the state’s habeas ma-
chinery to bear on federal military officials. General Lewis was 
“assuming criminal jurisdiction over a private citizen, holding 
him in the closest confinement, and contemning the civil au-
thority of the state.”55 The chief justice accordingly granted 
Stacy’s request for an order of attachment.56 By the time the 
first edition of his landmark Commentaries on American Law 
was published in 1826, Chief Justice Kent was ready to declare 
that, at least when dealing with habeas petitioners in military 
custody, it was “settled” that the state and federal courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction.57 
 
 51. Id. at 242 (Spencer, Van Ness, & Yates, JJ., concurring). 
 52. In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). 
 53. Id. at 329–30. 
 54. Id. at 330. 
 55. Id. at 334. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 375–76 (New York, 
O. Halsted 1826) (noting the uncertainty expressed in Ferguson and the sub-
sequent taking of jurisdiction in In re Stacy, and asserting that “[t]he question 
was, therefore, settled in favor of a concurrent jurisdiction in [In re Stacy], and 
there has been a similar decision by the courts of other states”); see also Oaks, 
supra note 23, at 275 (stating that, with the exception of Chief Justice Kent’s 
opinion in In re Stacy, “state court opinions and judgments seem to have been 
unanimous in favor of ” state courts’ jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by 
persons in federal custody). 
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Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, such 
cases were commonplace.58 In 1814, for example, a member of 
the South Carolina Supreme Court ordered a man discharged 
from the army, concluding that bounty officers working for the 
army had engaged in objectionable enlistment tactics.59 That 
same year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered 
a Russian boy released from the army, concluding that the 
child was too young to enlist and was not sufficiently fluent in 
English to understand the oath that army officials had admi-
nistered to him.60 During the same term, the Massachusetts 
high court ordered another minor discharged from the military 
on the grounds that he was too young to enter a valid enlist-
ment contract.61 In 1819, the New Jersey Supreme Court took 
jurisdiction of a habeas petition seeking the release of a minor 
from the army,62 and, in 1824, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court similarly took jurisdiction of a petition seeking the re-
lease of a minor from the marines.63 In 1827, New York’s Chief 
Justice John Savage ordered a twenty-one-year-old man dis-
charged from the army after concluding that he had not been of 
age at the time he enlisted.64 In 1836, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court ordered a minor released from the navy 
after finding that the minor’s guardian had not consented to 
the enlistment.65 In 1841, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
took jurisdiction of a habeas petition filed by a soldier seeking a 
discharge from the army on the grounds that he had been a 
minor at the time he enlisted.66 In 1843, Justice Esek Cowen, of 
 
 58. Cf. HURD, supra note 17, at 166 (“It may be considered settled that 
state courts may grant the writ in all cases of illegal confinement under the 
authority of the United States.”). 
 59. In re Merritt, 5 AM. L.J. 497, 501 (S.C. 1814) (Nott, J.). Bounty officers 
working for the army had handed Ephraim Merritt money as payment for his 
enlistment, but Merritt promptly threw the money on the floor. Id. at 499. The 
bounty officers argued that Merritt had held the money in his hands just long 
enough to constitute agreement to enlist. Id. 
 60. See Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 63, 63–66 (1814). 
The court stressed that it had the authority “to inquire into the circumstances, 
under which any person brought before them by writ of habeas corpus is con-
fined or restrained of his liberty.” Id. at 65. 
 61. Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 67, 70–71 (1814). 
 62. State v. Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 639, 643 (1819). 
 63. Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 Serg. & Rawle 93 (Pa. 1824). 
 64. In re Carlton, 7 Cow. 471, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827). 
 65. Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227, 231–32 (1836). 
 66. State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194, 197 (1841). The court stressed that it 
did not “make any difference that the illegal imprisonment, if there be one, is 
by an officer of the U.S. army. The courts of the United States have no exclu-
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the New York Supreme Court of Judicature, took jurisdiction of 
a habeas petition filed by a man seeking a discharge from the 
army on the grounds that he was not an American citizen.67 In 
1847, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered yet another 
minor released from the army, finding that the child’s parents 
had not consented to the enlistment.68 
In the eyes of the state judges who decided these cases, and 
apparently in the eyes of the federal officials who complied with 
the state judges’ orders,69 state courts’ intervention was easily 
justified. In short, the states were obliged to safeguard individ-
uals’ freedom, no matter what the source of the threat.70 In 
1813, Chief Justice Kent declared the guiding principle: “It is 
the indispensable duty of this court, and one to which every in-
ferior consideration must be sacrificed, to act as a faithful 
guardian of the personal liberty of the citizen, and to give ready 
and effectual aid to the means provided by law for its securi-
ty.”71 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated that same 
rationale more than thirty years later: 
[T]he writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the prerogative of the 
citizen; the safeguard of his person, and the security of liberty—no 
matter where or how the chains of his captivity were forged—the 
power of the judiciary in this state is adequate to crumble them to 
dust, if an individual is deprived of his liberty contrary to the law of 
the land.72 
The state courts recognized that ordering a person released 
from federal confinement was a matter of potentially national 
 
sive jurisdiction over those officers.” Id. at 197. On the merits, however, the 
court rejected the petition, finding that the soldier had ratified his enlistment 
contract by remaining in the army after reaching the age of twenty-one. Id. at 
199. 
 67. United States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill 16, 17–27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (con-
cluding that noncitizens could enter valid enlistment contracts, and rejecting 
the petition on the merits). 
 68. Commonwealth ex rel. Webster v. Fox, 7 Pa. 336, 337–40 (1847). 
 69. See In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 592, 596 (N.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 11,721) 
(stating that such cases were common and that there is no evidence “that any 
officer of the United States ever disregarded a discharge made by a state court 
or judge, on the ground that it was utterly void” for lack of jurisdiction). 
 70. See HURD, supra note 17, at 201 (“A sovereign state has a right to be 
informed why any of her citizens are imprisoned, simply because it is her duty 
to set them free from all illegal imprisonment.”). 
 71. In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); accord In re 
Bryan, 60 N.C. (2 Win.) 1, 28–31 (1863) (Battle, J.) (declaring that a state has 
no higher obligation “than that of protecting all her citizens” from unlawful 
restraint, even when held by persons acting under federal authority). 
 72. Webster, 7 Pa. at 338.  
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significance, and one to be treated with corresponding care.73 
But they took comfort in the knowledge that, if they did ever 
erroneously conclude that federal officials had behaved unlaw-
fully, the United States Supreme Court could simply correct 
the mistake through an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.74 
 
 73. See, e.g., Olmsted’s Case, Brightly 9, 15 (Pa. Ct. Nisi Prius 1809) (cau-
tioning that state courts must be “deeply sensible of the necessity of exercising 
[their power to release federal prisoners] with the greatest discretion”). 
 74. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. M’Lain v. Wright, 3 Grant 437, 444 
(Pa. 1863). Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court had the power 
to review the final judgment of a state’s highest court if, inter alia, the state 
court declared invalid a federal statute, a federal treaty, or “an authority exer-
cised under the United States.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 
85. Consequently, if a state court determined that federal officials behaved un-
lawfully and thus ordered a federal detainee released, the Supreme Court 
could review the state court’s ruling and, if necessary, reverse. See David E. 
Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, 14 OK-
LA. CITY U. L. REV. 521, 531 n.52 (1989). The 1789 Act also gave the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to review the final judgment of a state’s highest court if the 
state court rejected a federal claim of “title, right, privilege or exemption.” 
§ 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86. That statute would appear to have given the Court the 
power to review a state court’s ruling on a habeas petition if the state court 
rejected a prisoner’s claim that his or her detention violated federal law. 
Without elaboration, however, at least one modern-day commentator has re-
jected that reading of the 1789 Act. Engdahl, supra, at 531 n.52 (“The Judi-
ciary Act failed to provide for any federal court review if the state court denied 
[a federal prisoner’s habeas] petition.”). The confusion appears to be traceable 
to a decision rendered in 1813 by Chief Justice William Tilghman, of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In that case, Chief Justice Tilghman stated in 
dictum: “[I]t seems to be the general opinion, that from a decision on a habeas 
corpus, no appeal or writ of error lies; and, thus, points of vital importance to 
the United States, may be determined by state judges, without an opportunity 
of revision.” In re Lockington, 5 AM. L.J. 92, 96 (1813). (Note that Chief Justice 
Tilghman would foreclose Supreme Court jurisdiction in all habeas cases aris-
ing out of the state courts, not merely those cases in which state courts re-
jected claims of federally unlawful detention.) Almost twenty years later, a 
commentator cited Chief Justice Tilghman’s opinion as the lone authority for 
the same proposition. See THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287 
(Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1830). Another nineteenth-century 
commentator, in turn, cited Sergeant’s treatise mid-century as the lone au-
thority for the same proposition. See HURD, supra note 17, at 165. Closing the 
loop, Sergeant was the lone authority cited by Engdahl in 1989. Engdahl, su-
pra, at 531 n.52. Chief Justice Tilghman, whose assertion seems plainly in 
tension with the language of the 1789 Act, almost certainly sent these scholars 
down the wrong track. Section 25 of the 1789 Act—the principal section go-
verning the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction—was not substantially 
changed until 1914. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (broadening 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction); 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 400.06[3] (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the 1914 
Act). See generally REYNOLDS ROBERTSON & FRANCIS R. KIRKHAM, JURISDIC-
TION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 851–55 (1936) (describ-
ing the amendments to the 1789 Act). As explained below, the Supreme Court 
 2007] STATE HABEAS RELIEF 279 
 
The states could find no evidence that they had surren-
dered this critical feature of their sovereignty when they rati-
fied the Constitution.75 Justice Samuel Southard, of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, expressed the prevailing sentiment in 
1819, in a case involving a minor who had enlisted in the army: 
I think it will require, in me, a great struggle both of feeling and 
judgment, ever to arrive at the point, where I shall be prepared to de-
ny the jurisdiction of the state, and say, that she has surrendered her 
independence, on questions like this; that her highest judicial tribun-
als, for such purposes, is [sic] incapable of inquiring into the impri-
sonment of her citizens, no matter how gross or illegal it may be, pro-
vided it be by agents of the United States, and under colour of their 
laws. . . . 
  It is a right of judgment upon habeas corpus; it is a question of 
imprisonment or release of the citizen. When and how were that right 
and question, the dearest to the citizen; relating to the highest duty of 
a government, to the proudest attribute of sovereignty; given up and 
surrendered? . . . The power of this court, in rescuing the citizens 
from unlawful imprisonment, is without limit from [any apparent 
source]; and I do not see how it can be otherwise, so long as any por-
tion of sovereignty remains in the state.76 
State judges did not believe, however, that their power to 
release federal prisoners was unlimited. In particular, the state 
courts in the early 1800s were reticent to try to free people 
from federal confinement when that confinement was backed 
by federal judicial process. The Virginia Supreme Court de-
clared in 1821, for example, that state and federal courts en-
joyed concurrent jurisdiction “in all cases of illegal confinement 
under colour of the authority of the United States, when that 
confinement is not the consequence of a suit or prosecution pend-
 
began taking jurisdiction of states’ habeas cases long before the substantive 
changes of 1914. See infra notes 87–110, 129–66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859), and Tarble’s Case, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872)). Of course, even if there was uncertainty about 
whether Congress had actually given the Court the power to review state 
courts’ habeas rulings, no one doubted that Congress could confer such appel-
late jurisdiction if it so desired. 
 75. See, e.g., In re Bryan, 60 N.C. at 30–31 (“A jurisdiction so essential to 
the great privilege of going where one may please—a privilege which every 
citizen of the State would wish to enjoy as freely as the air he breathed—the 
State courts would hardly have parted with, except upon the most urgent ne-
cessity.”). 
 76. State v. Brearly, 5 N.J.L. 639, 643–44 (1819); accord Olmsted’s Case, 
Brightly at 14–15 (stating that the Constitution “leaves to the several states 
absolute supremacy in all cases in which it is not yielded to the United States” 
and that no source of law suggests that states surrendered their power to 
grant habeas relief to persons in federal custody). 
 280 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:265 
 
ing in the Courts of the United States.”77 When ordering a mi-
nor released from the army in 1847, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court noted, in a similar vein, that the minor had not been 
court-martialed for desertion, and stated that, “if he was in 
process of trial, this court would, perhaps, not look beyond or 
behind the proceedings which were to bring him before even a 
military court.”78 
In the 1850s, the state courts grew more ambitious. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court signaled the change in 1851, 
when it stated, in dictum, that it possessed the power to grant 
habeas relief to persons “held under color of process from the 
courts of the United States.”79 It was not long before such lan-
guage moved from dictum to operative text. In 1853, United 
States Attorney General Caleb Cushing was asked to provide 
advice to federal officials after a state court ordered a federally 
indicted prisoner set free.80 James Collier had been indicted by 
a federal grand jury for embezzling $300,000 in federal funds 
and, on the order of the District Court for the Northern District 
of California, had been taken into custody by federal law en-
forcement officers in Ohio.81 Collier petitioned an Ohio judge 
for habeas relief, alleging that the district court in California 
lacked jurisdiction.82 The Ohio judge ordered federal authori-
ties to bring Collier to the state courthouse for a hearing.83 
When the federal authorities complied, the state court ordered 
Collier released on bail pending its consideration of the merits 
of the habeas petition at the beginning of the court’s next 
term.84 The baffled federal authorities asked Cushing for his 
views concerning the legality of the state court’s actions.85 
Cushing firmly replied that state courts lacked jurisdiction to 
 
 77. Ex parte Pool, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 276, 278 (1821) (emphasis added). 
 78. Commonwealth ex rel. Webster v. Fox, 7 Pa. 336, 340 (1847). 
 79. In re Sims, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 309 (1851). The court conceded, 
however, that “it is manifest that this ought to be done only in a clear case, 
and in a case where it is necessary to the security of personal liberty from il-
legal restraint.” Id. In the case before it, concerning a fugitive slave who had 
been taken into federal custody, the court declined to take jurisdiction, stating 
that “it is quite competent for the judges of the United States courts to bring 
the petitioner before them by habeas corpus.” Id. 
 80. See Collier’s Case.—Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts, 6 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 103 (1853). 
 81. Id. at 104. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 105. 
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grant habeas relief to individuals who had been indicted by a 
federal grand jury and were being held pending trial, and he 
stated that, to the best of his knowledge, no one had ever ar-
gued to the contrary.86 
If Attorney General Cushing and his colleagues were sur-
prised by the Ohio court’s actions in Collier’s case, they were 
surely alarmed by the actions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
shortly thereafter—actions that dramatically drew the atten-
tion of the United States Supreme Court and that marked the 
beginning of the end for state courts’ power to come to the aid 
of persons being unlawfully detained by federal officials. 
B. THE WISCONSIN REBELLION: ABLEMAN V. BOOTH 
In the spring of 1854, federal authorities arrested Sherman 
Booth on suspicion of violating the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
by helping a slave named Joshua Glover escape to Canada.87 
While being held in Milwaukee by Stephen Ableman, the Unit-
ed States Marshal for the District of Wisconsin, Booth sought 
habeas relief from Justice Abram Smith, of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, arguing that the 1850 Act was unconstitutional.88 
Justice Smith agreed that the statute was unconstitutional and 
ordered Booth released.89 He vehemently rejected the “degrad-
ing insinuation” that state judges cannot be trusted to interpret 
and apply the Constitution in cases involving federal detai-
 
 86. Id. at 108. 
 87. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 2–4 (1854) (Smith, J.), rev’d, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
506 (1859); see Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, §§ 6–10, 9 Stat. 462, 463–65 (es-
tablishing a system for the capture and return of fugitive slaves), repealed by 
Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200. For an excellent discussion of 
Booth’s life and legal battles—from his rise to prominence as an abolitionist, 
to his litigation in the Wisconsin and federal courts, to his fall from grace for 
alleged sexual intimacies with a young girl—see FREDERICK J. BLUE, NO 
TAINT OF COMPROMISE: CRUSADERS IN ANTISLAVERY POLITICS 117–37 (2005). 
For a discussion of state officials’ resistance to the 1850 Act, see ROBERT M. 
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175–91 
(1975). 
 88. In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 7–8 (Smith, J.). 
 89. Id. at 47–49; see also id. at 36–37 (concluding that the U.S. Supreme 
Court erred when it struck down a Pennsylvania law aimed at protecting fugi-
tive slaves in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842)). In Prigg, the 
Court held that Pennsylvania’s slave-shielding law violated the Constitution’s 
Fugitive Slave Clause. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625–26; see also U.S. 
CONST. art. IV (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall . . . be discharged from such Service 
or Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Ser-
vice or Labor may be due.”). 
 282 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:265 
 
nees.90 He insisted that he had an obligation “to interpose a re-
sistance, to the extent of his power, to every assumption of 
power on the part of the general government, which is not ex-
pressly granted or necessarily implied in the federal constitu-
tion.”91 
The en banc Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld Justice 
Smith’s ruling. Writing for the court, Chief Justice Edward 
Whiton agreed that the 1850 Act was unconstitutional and that 
Booth was entitled to be released.92 The court indicated that, if 
the federal courts had taken jurisdiction of Booth’s case, the 
state courts would have declined jurisdiction in deference to the 
federal judiciary.93 In the court’s view, however, no case was 
yet pending before a federal district court—Booth had not yet 
been indicted, but rather had merely been taken into custody.94 
The federal government appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. In early 1855, while the government’s appeal was 
pending, Booth was indicted by a federal grand jury for violat-
ing the 1850 Act.95 Booth was tried, convicted, fined $1000, and 
sentenced to one month in prison.96 
Three days later, Booth returned to the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, again seeking habeas relief.97 Still convinced that 
the 1850 Act was unconstitutional, and seemingly untroubled 
by the fact that Booth was now under the sentence of a federal 
court, the Wisconsin high court granted Booth the relief he 
sought.98 Chief Justice Whiton declared that, without the pow-
er to order its citizens released from unlawful custody, “the 
state would be stripped of one of the most essential attributes 
of sovereignty, and would present the spectacle of a state claim-
ing the allegiance of its citizens, without the power to protect 
them in the enjoyment of their personal liberty upon its own 
soil.”99 The chief justice stated that, in his view, “the state gov-
ernments and state courts are not reduced to this humiliating 
condition,” but rather possess “the power to grant that relief 
 
 90. In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 35 (Smith, J.). 
 91. Id. at 23 (Smith, J.). 
 92. Id. at 58–66 (Whiton, C.J.). 
 93. Id. at 52–57 (Smith, J.). 
 94. Id. at 55–57 (Smith, J.). 
 95. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 509–10 (1859). 
 96. Id. at 510. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157, 175–218 (1854) (Whiton, C.J.). 
 99. Id. at 176 (Whiton, C.J.). 
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which all governments owe to those from whom they claim ob-
edience.”100 Justice Smith agreed, writing that “[t]he states 
never yielded to the federal government the guardianship of 
the liberties of their people.”101 If the federal courts were free to 
imprison citizens in violation of the Constitution and the states 
could do nothing about it, a state’s citizens could be confined 
behind “prison doors no earthly power could unlock. Such doc-
trine is monstrous. We have not yet reached the point of sub-
mission.”102 
The federal government again appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. When the Court asked Wisconsin offi-
cials to send it the case record so that it could process the ap-
peal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court defiantly ordered state offi-
cials to ignore the request.103 The Court nevertheless took 
jurisdiction of the case and consolidated it with the appeal that 
was already pending concerning the preindictment phase of 
Booth’s case.104 
In Ableman v. Booth, the Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney noted 
with alarm that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had attempted 
to free a federal prisoner who had been convicted of a federal 
crime, and then had tried to insulate its ruling from review by 
refusing to send the Court the necessary paperwork.105 The 
Court was not pleased: 
These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States, 
as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State courts over 
the courts of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted 
and acted upon in the Supreme Court of a State.106 
When explaining the reasons why the actions of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court were unacceptable, the Court made no 
 
 100. Id. (Whiton, C.J.). 
 101. Id. at 204 (Smith, J.). 
 102. Id. at 217 (Smith, J.). 
 103. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 512 (1859). A newspaper 
reporter wrote in 1904 that, at the time of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ac-
tions, the fledgling Republican Party in Wisconsin had adopted John C. Cal-
houn as their exemplar, they “only differed with Jeff[erson] Davis as to the 
doctrine of state rights in that he was too conservative,” and they often viewed 
federal officials as people with “horns and hoofs and a full Mephistophelion 
[sic] equipment.” Sherman Booth’s Trial Recalled, JANESVILLE GAZETTE 
(Wis.), Sept. 22, 1904, at 2 (on file with author). 
 104. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 506–15. 
 105. Id. at 513–14. 
 106. Id. at 514. 
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effort to distinguish the long line of cases in which state courts 
had adjudicated the habeas claims of persons being extrajudi-
cially held in federal custody.107 Indeed, the Court did not even 
allude to those cases. Instead, the Court appeared to conclude 
that state courts could never order a person released from fed-
eral confinement, no matter what the circumstances.108 The 
Court declared that the state and federal governments must 
operate 
within their respective spheres. And the sphere of action appro-
priated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial 
process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of divi-
sion was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the naked 
eye.109 
State court jurisdiction over federal prisoners’ habeas claims, 
in other words, is constitutionally proscribed. When presented 
with a habeas petition filed by a person within its borders, a 
state court may demand a response from the custodian, so that 
the court can determine whether the custodian is acting under 
federal authority. But once 
the State judge or court [has been] judicially apprized that the party 
is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can pro-
ceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the do-
minion and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the 
writ of habeas corpus, nor any other process issued under State au-
thority, can pass over the line of division between the two sovereign-
ties.110 
In the years immediately following Ableman, state courts 
debated the scope of the Court’s holding. Had the Court held 
that state courts can never grant habeas relief to persons in 
federal custody? Or, had it instead held that state courts lack 
the power to award habeas relief only in circumstances such as 
those present in Ableman itself, where the prisoner has been 
the subject of federal judicial proceedings? A small number of 
jurists took the former, broader view. When three conscripted 
men sought release from the confederate army on grounds of 
physical disability, for example, Chief Justice A.J. Walker, of 
the Alabama Supreme Court, held that, under Ableman, “a 
State court or officer has no right of control over the conduct of 
 
 107. See supra notes 28–78 and accompanying text (discussing these cas-
es). 
 108. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 524–25. 
 109. Id. at 516. 
 110. Id. at 523. During the lame-duck period following his failed reelection 
bid for the presidency in 1860, President James Buchanan pardoned Booth for 
his actions. Sherman Booth’s Trial Recalled, supra note 103. 
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the officers of the general government, in the exercise of an au-
thority bestowed by its law.”111 Two justices of the Michigan 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when they voted 
to deny habeas relief to a federal soldier who argued that he 
was not obliged to serve because his name had been misspelled 
on his draft notice.112 
Most state courts read Ableman’s holding narrowly, how-
ever, concluding that they continued to possess the power to 
adjudicate habeas petitions filed by persons being held by fed-
eral officers without the backing of federal judicial process.113 
State courts pointed out that, in Ableman, Sherman Booth had 
been convicted and imprisoned under federal judicial authori-
ty.114 In the eyes of these courts, the portions of Chief Justice 
 
 111. Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429, 437 (1863) (Walker, C.J.). 
 112. See In re Spangler, 11 Mich. 298, 304 (1863) (Martin, C.J.) (stating 
that state courts lack jurisdiction to proceed once they have determined that a 
petitioner is being held under federal authority); id. at 310 (Manning, J.) (con-
cluding that state and federal courts each have exclusive jurisdiction in ha-
beas cases involving their own prisoners, such that state courts cannot grant 
habeas relief to federal prisoners and federal courts cannot grant habeas relief 
to state prisoners). 
 113. See, e.g., Lanahan v. Birge, 30 Conn. 438, 438–49 (1862) (adjudicating 
the habeas claim of a minor seeking release from military service); Wantlan v. 
White, 19 Ind. 470, 472–73 (1862) (granting habeas relief to a minor seeking 
release from military service); Ex parte Anderson, 16 Iowa 595, 598–99 (1864) 
(holding that state courts have the power to order minors released from 
invalid enlistment contracts, but declining to grant Anderson’s petition be-
cause he had been arrested for desertion and was “awaiting his trial before a 
court martial”); McConologue’s Case, 107 Mass. 154, 160–70 (1871) (granting 
habeas relief to a minor seeking release from military service); Ex parte Hill, 5 
Nev. 154, 158 (1869) (“[Ableman held] that in every case where process, regu-
lar on its face, has been issued from a court of the United States having power 
to issue process of such a nature, the officer acting thereunder is fully pro-
tected against any interference from a State court . . . .”); In re Disinger, 12 
Ohio St. 256, 257–63 (1861) (adjudicating the habeas claim of a minor seeking 
release from military service); Shirk’s Case, 3 Grant 460, 461–64 (Pa. 1863) 
(holding that state courts generally “have power to discharge, on habeas cor-
pus, minors who are held to service under invalid contracts of enlistment,” but 
declining to grant Shirk’s petition because federal judicial processes were un-
derway); Commonwealth ex rel. Bressler v. Gane, 3 Grant 447, 456–57 (Pa. 
1863) (narrowly construing Ableman as holding only “that when a person is 
held to appear and answer before a United States court, or when a person has 
been convicted before a court of the United States . . . , the judgment cannot be 
reviewed and revised by a State court”); Mann v. Parke, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 443, 
452 (1864) (granting habeas relief to a person seeking release from the Confe-
derate army on the grounds of a statutory exemption); In re Gregg, 15 Wis. 
479, 479–81 (1862) (adjudicating the habeas claim of a minor seeking release 
from military service). 
 114. See, e.g., Mims v. Wimberly, 33 Ga. 587, 596 (1863) (“[I]t must be 
borne in mind that the question of imprisonment, by authority other than 
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Taney’s opinion that extended beyond the facts of Booth’s case 
were merely dictum.115 Moreover, these courts believed that, if 
the Court had intended to denounce the states’ longstanding 
practice of adjudicating habeas petitions filed by federal extra-
judicial detainees, the Court would at least have acknowledged 
that practice’s existence. Chief Justice Walter Lowrie, of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, observed that “[c]ases abound 
where the State judges have . . . interfered by habeas corpus 
with the acts of Federal officers,”116 and stated that he had no 
doubt “that the records of the State courts here (Pittsburg) 
would show hundreds of such cases.”117 Justice Joseph Beck, of 
the Iowa Supreme Court, noted that state courts had long tak-
en jurisdiction of habeas petitions filed by persons held in fed-
eral custody: “I find that the jurisdiction has been exercised by 
State courts and judges in fifteen States, and in more than se-
venty reported cases, and doubtless in many other cases that 
have not been reported, and of which no mention has been 
made in the law journals and newspapers.”118 If the Ableman 
Court had intended to reject this well-established line of cases, 
state judges reasoned, Chief Justice Taney surely would have 
made reference to them and explained why their reasoning was 
flawed. 
State judges were not alone in concluding that Ableman’s 
holding was narrower than its language suggested. Judge Na-
than Hall, of the Northern District of New York, for example, 
stated that during his tenure as a state judge, he “repeated[ly]” 
exercised his power to discharge minors from the federal mili-
tary, that his colleagues on the state bench “frequently” exer-
cised the same power, and that “it is not doubted that many 
 
judicial, was not in that case.”); McConologue’s Case, 107 Mass. at 167 (“[In 
Ableman,] no question arose . . . of the effect, as against a writ of habeas cor-
pus from a state court, of the detention of a citizen by a mere executive officer, 
civil or military, of the United States, without color of judicial process or pro-
ceeding of any kind.”). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Bryan, 60 N.C. (Win.) 1, 23–24 (1863) (Pearson, C.J.); 
Commonwealth ex rel. M’Lain v. Wright, 3 Grant 437, 440 (Pa. 1863) (stating 
that, if Chief Justice Taney meant to deny state courts the power to grant ha-
beas relief to all persons held in federal custody, “he meant more than the case 
called for, and all beyond is mere obiter dictum”). 
 116. M’Lain, 3 Grant at 442. 
 117. Id. at 444; accord Bressler, 3 Grant at 455 (“[T]he right of State courts 
to try the legality of the imprisonment under color of authority of the United 
States . . . has been exercised almost daily by the State courts within the last 
two years . . . .”). 
 118. Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88, 175 (1869) (Beck, J., dissenting). 
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hundreds of minors were discharged from the army under 
every administration of the war department, and during every 
year from 1814 to 1860.”119 Judge Hall remarked that, if the 
Court had intended 
to strike down by a single blow a jurisdiction which had been uninter-
ruptedly exercised by state courts and judges for more than thirty 
years, the chief justice would have expressed that intention in dis-
tinct terms, and would have given these cases a passing notice, and 
expressly disapproved their doctrines, if he had not attempted to 
maintain their unsoundness by opposing arguments.120 
At least two United States Attorneys General agreed. In 
1861, a district attorney in Pennsylvania sent a letter to United 
States Attorney General Edward Bates, asking for advice about 
how to respond when minors applied to state courts for dis-
charge from the federal military.121 Bates replied that “[i]t is 
not a part of the official duties of district attorneys to resist ap-
plications of this kind in the State courts.”122 He stated that, 
when minors enlisted without the consent of their parents or 
guardians and then subsequently applied for state habeas re-
lief, such applications could not “be successfully resisted under 
existing laws.”123 
Six years later, after a Pennsylvania court ordered the 
navy to bring a minor named Charles Gormley to court for a 
hearing about whether Gormley should be released from the 
military, navy officials asked United States Attorney General 
Henry Stanbery how they should respond.124 Stanbery ex-
amined Ableman and concluded that he could not “understand 
the language of the court . . . , in reference to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the United States, as applicable to any other juris-
diction over persons restrained of their liberty than that which 
depends upon jurisdiction acquired under process of the courts 
of the United States.”125 It was possible, Stanbery believed, 
that the Supreme Court might, in a future case, strip state 
courts of all power to order persons released from federal cus-
 
 119. In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 592, 595–96 (N.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 11,721). 
 120. Id. at 604. 
 121. See Duty of District Attorneys, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 146, 146 (1861). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. Due to the frequency with which such cases arose, however, Bates 
observed that it might be wise for the district attorney to attend the hearings 
and ensure that the applicants were entitled to release. Id. 
 124. See Gormley’s Case—Habeas Corpus, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 258, 259–60 
(1867). 
 125. Id. at 273–74. 
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tody, even in cases lacking federal judicial process.126 But he 
believed that, in the meantime, federal military officials should 
continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the state courts.127 
Stanbery declared that he had no doubt that the Pennsylvania 
court would make the proper decision regarding Gormley’s dis-
charge.128 
Attorney General Stanbery’s prediction of future Supreme 
Court involvement proved correct, and it was once again the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court that provided the occasion. 
C. THE WISCONSIN REBELLION REDUX: TARBLE’S CASE 
On July 27, 1869, Edward Tarble went to the United 
States Army’s recruiting station in Madison, Wisconsin, and 
enlisted for a five-year tour of duty.129 He enlisted under the 
name “Frank Brown” and, although he was under the age of 
eighteen, he told army officials that he was twenty-one.130 
Within days of enlisting, Tarble had a change of heart; he in-
itially fled, but then quickly turned himself in to his enlisting 
officer, Lieutenant H.A. Stone.131 Stone placed Tarble under ar-
rest for desertion.132 Abijah Tarble, Edward’s father, then peti-
tioned a county commissioner for habeas relief on behalf of his 
son, arguing that the enlistment was invalid.133 After the com-
missioner granted the request and ordered Tarble discharged, 
Stone appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.134 
Joined by Justice Orsamus Cole, Justice Byron Paine be-
gan the court’s opinion innocently enough. He accurately noted 
that, “[w]ith few exceptions, jurisdiction in this class of cases 
has been asserted and exercised by state judicial officers, and 
sustained by the highest state courts from the beginning of the 
 
 126. See id. at 275 (stating that, if a state court ordered Gormley released, 
federal officials could determine at that time whether it would be “expedient 
to carry the question to the Supreme Court of the United States for final deci-
sion”). 
 127. Id. at 274 (instructing navy officials to produce Gormley’s body in 
compliance with the state court’s order). 
 128. Id. at 275. 
 129. In re Tarble, 25 Wis. 390, 391 (1870), rev’d, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 
(1872). 
 130. Id. at 392. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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government down to the present day.”135 Nothing in the Feder-
al Constitution, he determined, “abridg[ed] the well-settled 
power of the state courts over the writ, or exempt[ed] federal 
officers from its operation.”136 Justice Paine observed that Tar-
ble was under the age of eighteen and that, under federal law, 
his enlistment was thus invalid.137 Moreover, although Tarble 
had been arrested for desertion, court-martial proceedings had 
not yet begun, and so “no question arises in respect to taking a 
prisoner from the custody of such a court.”138 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court thus appeared poised to join the many state 
courts that had read Ableman narrowly by concluding that 
state courts lacked jurisdiction in cases of federal detention on-
ly when the habeas applicant had been the subject of federal 
judicial process.139 
It seems, however, that the court was still stinging from 
the rebuke it had suffered in Ableman. Unfortunately for young 
Edward Tarble, this would mean that his plea to be discharged 
from the military would get swept up in what was, in signifi-
cant part, a rehashing of Sherman Booth’s case. 
Going out of his way to criticize the United States Supreme 
Court, Justice Paine said that it was important to remember 
that, while fugitive American slaves were finding relief in Can-
ada, the American high court in Dred Scott “was denying to one 
of an oppressed race born on our soil the poor privilege of even 
suing for his rights in a federal court.”140 The only reason that 
the Supreme Court’s members had gotten involved in Booth’s 
case, Justice Paine asserted, was that they were “shocked” 
when the Wisconsin Supreme Court “decided against the valid-
ity of a law passed to sustain the institution of slavery.”141 Be-
cause Ableman was a pro-slavery ruling, Justice Paine implied, 
it was entitled to little regard.142 
 
 135. Id. at 394; see supra notes 28–78 and accompanying text (discussing 
these cases). 
 136. In re Tarble, 25 Wis. at 394. 
 137. Id. at 412. 
 138. Id. at 413. 
 139. See, e.g., Lanahan v. Birge, 30 Conn. 438, 438–49 (1862) (construing 
Ableman narrowly); see supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing these cases). 
 140. In re Tarble, 25 Wis. at 394–95 (alluding to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 393 (1856)). 
 141. Id. at 407. 
 142. See id. Justice Paine was not alone in casting Ableman in this unflat-
tering light. In Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88 (1869), Judge Joseph Beck wrote 
that Ableman “was decided when the institution of slavery controlled this gov-
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Justice Paine pressed still further, accusing the Ableman 
Court of confusion. The Supreme Court in Ableman—and, in-
deed, the many state courts that subsequently read the rule 
under Ableman as turning on whether federal judicial proceed-
ings had commenced143—simply failed to understand what was 
really at issue. When deciding whether a state court had the 
power to order a person released from federal custody, Justice 
Paine wrote, the existence of federal judicial process was not 
dispositive.144 A state judge could order a person released from 
federal confinement—notwithstanding the fact that the person 
was detained under color of federal judicial authority—if the 
state judge determined that the federal court lacked jurisdic-
tion.145 In Sherman Booth’s case, Justice Paine explained, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850 was unconstitutional, and that the district court thus 
lacked jurisdiction over Booth’s prosecution.146 In its eagerness 
to sustain the Fugitive Slave Act, the Supreme Court had failed 
to see that the Wisconsin court had not claimed the power to 
review and revise federal courts’ judgments.147 “It has never 
been claimed by any one,” Justice Paine stressed, “that the 
state courts had any right to discharge a person legally held in 
custody under the authority of the United States, either with or 
without process.”148 
Justice Paine acknowledged that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court behaved inappropriately when it tried to thwart the Su-
preme Court’s review in Ableman by withholding the case 
record.149 He further acknowledged that, if Congress had not 
given the Supreme Court the power to review state courts’ rul-
 
ernment” and was just one part of a larger federal effort “to nationalize and 
propagate the institution.” Id. at 141 (Beck, J., dissenting). He predicted that 
Ableman would be overruled and stated that he was not aware of any legal 
principle that required him to obey it. Id. at 148–49. See generally COVER, su-
pra note 87, at 187 n.* (suggesting that the Court in Tarble’s Case was forced 
to reiterate the principles it declared in Ableman v. Booth because some state 
judges believed “the unambiguous language [in Ableman] could not be trusted 
because of its intimate connection with slavery”). 
 143. See, e.g., Lanahan, 30 Conn. at 438–49 (construing Ableman narrow-
ly); see supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
 144. See In re Tarble, 25 Wis. at 395–96, 403 (noting the importance at-
tached by other state courts to the question of federal judicial process). 
 145. Id. at 396–400. 
 146. Id. at 402. 
 147. Id. at 396–400, 403, 407–08. 
 148. Id. at 408 (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. at 407 (stating that the Wisconsin court’s actions were, “in truth, 
contrary to the entire current of authority”). 
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ings in cases involving federal prisoners, the argument that 
federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction in such cases 
“would be very strong.”150 But the Supreme Court did have the 
power to review state courts’ habeas rulings in cases declaring 
federal actions invalid, as in the present case.151 Consequently, 
the state courts could take jurisdiction of Tarble’s petition and 
order him discharged.152 If the Supreme Court disagreed with 
that ruling, it could simply reverse. 
The United States Supreme Court did precisely that. Not-
ing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had claimed for itself 
the power to set free even those federal prisoners who had been 
convicted of federal crimes, the Court framed the issue pre-
sented in sweeping terms: 
Whether any judicial officer of a State has jurisdiction to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus, or to continue proceedings under the writ when is-
sued, for the discharge of a person held under the authority, or claim 
and color of authority, of the United States, by an officer of that gov-
ernment.153 
The Court answered that question resoundingly in the 
negative. As it had in Ableman,154 the Court insisted that the 
state and federal governments must remain confined to “their 
respective spheres” and that “[n]either government can intrude 
within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by 
its judicial officers with the action of the other.”155 Observing 
that the Constitution gave Congress the power to “raise and 
support armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” the 
Court concluded that the states must not be permitted to inter-
fere with the exercise of those powers.156 The fact that the gov-
ernment could appeal to the Supreme Court whenever a soldier 
was improperly discharged did not provide the federal govern-
ment with an adequate safeguard against state interference: 
Proceedings on habeas corpus are summary, and the delay incident to 
bringing the decision of a State officer, through the highest tribunal 
 
 150. Id. at 403. 
 151. Id. at 404. 
 152. Id. at 412–13 (affirming the county commissioner’s grant of habeas 
relief ). Chief Justice Luther Dixon filed a one-sentence dissent, concluding 
“that jurisdiction of the writ of habeas corpus, in cases of this nature, is vested 
exclusively in the courts of the United States.” Id. at 413 (Dixon, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
 153. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 402 (1872). 
 154. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1859) (using compara-
ble reasoning). 
 155. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 406. 
 156. Id. at 408 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
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of the State, to this court for review, would necessarily occupy years, 
and in the meantime, where the soldier was discharged, the mischief 
would be accomplished. It is manifest that the powers of the National 
government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all 
times, if its acts could be interfered with and controlled for any period 
by officers or tribunals of another sovereignty.157 
Noting that Congress had long ago given the federal courts 
the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving 
federal prisoners, the Court declared that, if a person is being 
held illegally by federal officials, “it is for the courts or judicial 
officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone, 
to grant him release.”158 Justice Field asserted that federal 
judges are just as likely as state judges to provide the appro-
priate relief when federal officials confine a person unlawfully: 
“Certainly there can be no ground for supposing that [federal 
judges’] action will be less prompt and efficient in such cases 
than would be that of State tribunals and State officers.”159 
Based on those rationales, the Court imposed firm limits 
on state courts’ powers. When presented with a habeas peti-
tion, the state court must examine its contents to determine 
whether the petitioner is “confined under the authority, or 
claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an of-
ficer of that government.”160 If the petition makes it clear that 
the prisoner is indeed so held, the state court must refuse to is-
sue the writ.161 If the petition does not indicate the nature of 
the prisoner’s confinement, then the state court has the power 
to demand that the prisoner’s custodian provide a return, giv-
ing sufficient factual details “to show distinctly that the impri-
sonment is under the authority, or claim and color of the au-
thority, of the United States, and to exclude the suspicion of 
imposition or oppression on his part.”162 At that point, the state 
proceedings must come to an end.163 Because Tarble’s petition 
made it apparent that the young man was being held by federal 
authorities “under claim and color of the authority of the Unit-
ed States, as an enlisted soldier mustered into the military ser-
 
 157. Id. at 409. 
 158. Id. at 411; see also Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20., § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 
(granting federal jurisdiction over habeas claims brought by federal prison-
ers). 
 159. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 411. 
 160. Id. at 409. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 409–10. 
 163. Id. at 410. 
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vice of the National government,” the Wisconsin courts lacked 
jurisdiction to grant him relief.164 
Unlike its ruling in Ableman, the Court’s ruling in Tarble’s 
Case was not unanimous. Chief Justice Salmon Chase dis-
sented, arguing that he could find no evidence that the Consti-
tution stripped the state courts of the power to protect their cit-
izens from unlawful confinement at the hands of federal 
officials.165 He was of the same view as the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court: 
I have no doubt of the right of a State court to inquire into the juris-
diction of a Federal court upon habeas corpus, and to discharge when 
satisfied that the petitioner for the writ is restrained of liberty by the 
sentence of a court without jurisdiction. If it errs in deciding the ques-
tion of jurisdiction, the error must be corrected [by the Supreme 
Court on appeal]. I have still less doubt, if possible, that a writ of ha-
beas corpus may issue from a State court to inquire into the validity 
of imprisonment or detention, without the sentence of any court 
whatever, by an officer of the United States.166 
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Chase’s dissent, the debate 
about the scope of state courts’ power to come to the aid of fed-
eral prisoners was over. Quickly falling into line, the state 
courts conceded that they could no longer order persons re-
leased from federal custody, no matter what the circums-
tances.167 Commentators endorsed the Supreme Court’s ac-
 
 164. Id. at 411–12. 
 165. Id. at 412–13 (Chase, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, he found contrary au-
thority in the Suspension Clause. See id. at 413; see also infra notes 226–79 
and accompanying text (discussing the Suspension Clause). 
 166. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 412 (Chase, C.J., dissenting). 
 167. See, e.g., Copenhaver v. Stewart, 24 S.W. 161, 163 (Mo. 1893) (“[I]t 
must be taken as now well-established law that state courts and the judges 
thereof have no jurisdiction or power to discharge persons who are held in cus-
tody by authority of the federal courts . . . or by officers of the United States 
acting under the laws thereof . . . .”); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Butler, 
19 Pa. Super. 626, 634 (Super. Ct. 1902) (stating that “there is now no room 
for controversy” regarding state courts’ power to release unlawfully enlisted 
minors from federal military obligations). Shortly after Tarble’s Case was de-
cided, commentator Rollin Hurd predicted that this would be the states’ reac-
tion: 
However much the weight of state decision may be against the doc-
trine of the Tarble case, and however much the pride of a state may 
be offended by being compelled to submit to the imprisonment of its 
citizens, without power to inquire into the cause of their detention, 
still the peace and harmony of the whole people require that the state 
courts should conform their practice to the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 198 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1972) 
(2d ed. 1876). 
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tions.168 Seymour Thompson wrote in 1884, for example, that 
state courts’ assertion of power to grant habeas relief to federal 
prisoners had been based upon an “extravagant” perception of 
states’ rights and had “present[ed] the spectacle of the courts of 
one sovereign controlling the officers and agents of another so-
vereign.”169 In Tarble’s Case, Thompson declared, the Court fi-
nally “swept into the limbo of vanities nearly a hundred re-
ported decisions of the State courts in which such a jurisdiction 
had been asserted and exercised.”170 
II.  THE FUTILITY OF EFFORTS TO RATIONALIZE 
ABLEMAN AND TARBLE’S CASE   
While condemning the constitutional rationale on which 
the Court based its rulings in Ableman and Tarble’s Case, scho-
lars today attempt to justify those holdings on grounds of im-
plied preemption and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Yet neither the 
text nor the legislative history of the 1789 Act indicates that 
Congress objected to concurrent state and federal jurisdiction 
for habeas claims brought by federal extrajudicial detainees. 
Any conflicts between state-court jurisdiction and federal inter-
ests are not of sufficient magnitude to warrant concluding that 
Congress wants federal courts’ jurisdiction to be exclusive. 
Moreover, under the removal statutes that have been on the 
books since the mid-1900s, the federal custodian in any par-
ticular case could easily remove a federal prisoner’s state ha-
beas petition to federal court if the custodian preferred to liti-
gate in a federal forum. 
A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: IMPLIED PREEMPTION, NOT 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION 
The Court’s conclusion in Ableman and Tarble’s Case—that 
state courts lack jurisdiction to award habeas relief to persons 
in federal custody, regardless of whether there have been fed-
eral judicial proceedings—has remained largely unquestioned 
 
 168. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 
HARV. L. REV. 345, 353 (1930) (stating that state courts’ assertion of jurisdic-
tion over federal prisoners’ habeas claims was “an exercise of power entirely 
incompatible with the constitutional relations of the Federal and State Gov-
ernments”). 
 169. Seymour D. Thompson, Abuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1884). 
 170. Id. at 5. 
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since it was announced well over a century ago.171 Modern 
scholars do, however, justifiably condemn the central argument 
that the Court marshaled in support of that conclusion. Gerald 
Neuman, for example, has characterized the Court’s analysis as 
“embarrassingly absolute,”172 while Professor Akhil Reed Amar 
has described it as “shaky, and its language quite sloppy.”173 
The core problem is easily described. By rigidly declaring that 
state courts are barred from interfering with the federal gov-
ernment’s actions and must remain confined to their assigned 
“sphere,” the Court paid little heed to the conventional view 
that, under the plan devised by the Constitution’s framers, the 
creation of lower federal courts lay entirely within Congress’s 
discretion.174 If Congress opted not to create a lower federal ju-
 
 171. Cf. DUKER, supra note 3, at 155 (“In recent years [Ableman and Tar-
ble’s Case have] gone unquestioned.”). 
 172. Neuman, supra note 10, at 596. 
 173. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1509 (1987). 
 174. See YACKLE, supra note 8, at 135–36 (“[The Tarble Court] neglected 
the conventional understanding that Congress might never have created the 
lower federal courts and might have relied, instead, on state courts to police 
the system, subject to appellate review by the Supreme Court.”); Collins, su-
pra note 9, at 101–02 (arguing that, if Tarble’s Case is understood to rest on a 
constitutional foundation, it “runs headlong into the traditional understanding 
that Congress was under no obligation to create lower federal courts”); Ri-
chard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141, 1205 (1988) (“Tarble’s Case, if read literally as founded on propositions 
of constitutional law, strikes directly at one of the foundation stones of the Fe-
deralist model: the proposition that state courts enjoy constitutional parity 
with federal courts.”); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of 
Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 
112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2225–26 (2003) (stating that, if Tarble’s Case holds “that 
the Constitution prohibits the States from subjecting federal officials to ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction, . . . [then the case] seems inconsistent with the Madi-
sonian Compromise during the framing of the Constitution, which produced 
the Article III provision that authorizes, but does not require, Congress to es-
tablish lower federal courts”); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 4 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the 
compromise of leaving it to Congress to decide whether to create inferior fed-
eral courts); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1463 (dis-
cussing the acceptance at the Constitutional Convention of the proposal to 
leave it to Congress to decide whether to create inferior federal courts); 
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 62 (1923) (discussing the debate within the Senate 
Special Judiciary Committee of 1789 regarding original jurisdiction in federal 
courts). Some scholars believe that, in fact, the Constitution obliged Congress 
to create lower federal courts with at least limited powers. See generally RI-
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diciary, the duty of providing relief when federal officials ex-
ceeded their powers would fall squarely on state courts’ shoul-
ders. State courts could hardly be charged with that vital task 
if, as Ableman and Tarble’s Case would have it, the Constitu-
tion required state courts to remain safely tucked away in a 
separate, designated domain.175 
Rather than reject the Court’s conclusion, however, scho-
lars have hastened to justify it on other grounds. The conven-
tional view today is that the rule announced in Ableman and 
Tarble’s Case should be viewed not as constitutionally man-
dated, but rather as congressionally prescribed. Although none 
of them has probed the matter with any depth, scholars gener-
ally believe that, when Congress granted federal courts the 
power to award habeas relief to federal prisoners in the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,176 Congress intended federal courts’ jurisdic-
tion to be exclusive.177 On this view, the Constitution does not 
 
CHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330–34 (5th ed. 2003) (briefly recounting some of 
the leading arguments in this ongoing scholarly debate). 
 175. Moreover, if the rule announced in Ableman and Tarble’s Case were 
constitutionally mandated and state courts were thus powerless to come to the 
aid of federal prisoners, serious due process problems would arise if Congress 
chose not to establish any lower federal courts. See Collins, supra note 9, at 
102; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the 
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 
124 U. PA. L. REV. 34, 51 (1975); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person 
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). As Waxman and Morrison point out, the possibility of filing an 
original petition for the writ in the United States Supreme Court might fall 
short of resolving the due process problem. See Waxman & Morrison, supra 
note 174, at 2226 n.130. 
 176. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. 
 177. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 173, at 1510 (“Ableman and Tarble’s Case 
can be justified only if they are understood simply as attributing to Congress a 
desire for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings against 
federal officers.”); Collins, supra note 9, at 102–03 (“[I]t is possible to read 
Tarble . . . not as about constitutionally exclusive jurisdiction, but as merely 
expressing an implicit congressional preference for federal statutory exclusivi-
ty in federal officer habeas cases . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the 
Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1074 n.31 
(1998) (stating that, while the Court in Tarble’s Case appeared to perceive a 
constitutional basis for its holding, the holding “can be rationalized more 
plausibly on the ground that federal statutes” implicitly created an exclusive 
federal remedy for federal prisoners); Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Jus-
ticiability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 
1174 n.114 (1984) (“Tarble’s Case should be read to rest upon an implied con-
gressional intent that habeas actions to release enlisted soldiers from the mili-
tary be restricted to federal court.”); Neuman, supra note 10, at 596 
(“[M]odern commentators . . . re-rationalize [Ableman and Tarble’s Case] as 
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prevent the states from providing habeas relief to persons be-
ing detained by federal officials without judicial authority.178 
Because Congress has opted to give the federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over such cases, however, state courts’ jurisdiction 
has been statutorily preempted, and the bar recognized in Ab-
leman and Tarble’s Case remains in place. 
That argument has the virtue of acknowledging that the 
Constitution’s framers were willing to permit state courts to 
play the leading role in ensuring that federal officials behaved 
within the limits of the law. In the end, however, the effort to 
shore up Ableman and Tarble’s Case with an implied-
preemption rationale is unpersuasive. 
B. THE FAILURE OF THE IMPLIED-PREEMPTION RATIONALE 
The state and federal courts have long been understood to 
share concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under federal 
law, unless Congress otherwise provides.179 State judges, after 
 
resting on an implied preemption of state court remedies for federal prisoners 
by the provision of constitutionally adequate remedies in federal court.”); Re-
dish & Woods, supra note 175, at 101 (stating that Tarble’s Case establishes a 
presumption against state-court jurisdiction in habeas cases involving federal 
prisoners—a presumption that “can be overcome only by a carefully consi-
dered, conscious decision by Congress”); Margaret G. Stewart, Federalism and 
Supremacy: Control of State Judicial Decision-Making, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
431, 432 n.7 (1992) (suggesting that a congressional preference for exclusive 
federal jurisdiction “may explain the result in cases preventing state courts 
from . . . granting habeas corpus to one in federal custody”); Amanda L. Tyler, 
Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 400 (2006) (“[T]he 
most defensible reading of Tarble’s Case is that the Court interpreted Con-
gress’s provision for federal court habeas jurisdiction with respect to federal 
petitioners as impliedly exclusive of state courts.”); Waxman & Morrison, su-
pra note 174, at 2227 (arguing that Tarble’s Case is best understood as resting 
upon a determination that “the pertinent statutes reflected an implicit con-
gressional determination that state jurisdiction was not appropriate”). 
 178. Some scholars have argued that the Constitution does bar the states 
from granting habeas relief to federal prisoners who are confined pursuant to 
federal judicial process. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some 
Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Ar-
ticle III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 808–09 & n.535 (1998) (arguing that 
Article III “creates a constitutional prohibition, evidently beyond Congress’s 
power to alter, against state court interference with or revision of [a] federal 
court’s judgment,” but that “Congress could permissibly authorize state courts 
to determine the legality of federal executive detention, with the absence of 
any such authorization explaining Tarble’s holding (but not its language)”). 
 179. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“Under [our] system of 
dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent 
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising 
under the laws of the United States.”); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 
U.S. 502, 507–08 (1962) (“[E]xclusive federal court jurisdiction over cases aris-
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all, are ordinarily presumed to be fully competent to interpret 
and apply federal law.180 As the Supreme Court has pointed 
out, “[s]tate judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to 
the Constitution of the United States,” and even when they 
disagree with one another about how the Constitution should 
be interpreted, “there is no reason to think that . . . all are not 
doing their mortal best to discharge their oath of office.”181 
When state courts do go astray and interpret federal law inap-
propriately, the ordinary remedy is the same remedy that ap-
plies when the lower federal courts go astray: the Supreme 
Court can take the case on direct review and correct the er-
ror.182 
The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is “deeply 
rooted” and can be overcome only “if Congress affirmatively 
ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal 
claim.”183 Congress can “confine jurisdiction [over claims aris-
ing under federal law] to the federal courts either explicitly or 
implicitly.”184 That is, “the presumption of concurrent jurisdic-
tion can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by un-
mistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear 
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal in-
terests.”185 As applied to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and state 
 
ing under federal law has been the exception rather than the rule.”); Claflin v. 
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“[I]f exclusive jurisdiction [over claims 
arising under federal law] be neither express nor implied, the State courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they are 
competent to take it.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 461 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“When . . . we consider the State gov-
ernments and the national governments . . . as parts of ONE WHOLE, the in-
ference seems to be conclusive that the State courts would have a concurrent 
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union where it was not 
expressly prohibited.”). 
 180. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366–67 (2001) (“[T]hat state courts 
could enforce federal law is presumed by Article III of the Constitution, which 
leaves to Congress the decision whether to create lower federal courts at all.”). 
 181. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI 
(“[J]udicial officers . . . of the several states shall be bound by Oath or Affirma-
tion, to support this Constitution.”). 
 182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered 
by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had may be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court . . . .”); Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 465 (holding that 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate federal civil RICO 
claims because, inter alia, if state courts handle such claims improperly, the 
Court can correct the errors on direct review). 
 183. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459. 
 184. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). 
 185. Id.; see also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 
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courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate federal extrajudicial detainees’ 
habeas claims, none of those three possibilities survives close 
examination. 
1. The Absence of “an Explicit Statutory Directive” 
When it gave federal courts the power to award habeas re-
lief to federal prisoners, Congress did not state that it wanted 
federal courts’ jurisdiction to be exclusive. In section 14 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress simply declared that federal 
courts and judges “shall have power to grant writs of habeas 
corpus [to federal prisoners] for the purpose of an inquiry into 
the cause of commitment.”186 As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, “[i]t is black letter law . . . that the mere grant of juris-
diction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court 
from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action.”187 There 
is nothing in the 1789 Act that expressly indicates that Con-
gress was doing anything more than merely conferring concur-
rent jurisdiction upon the federal courts. 
Moreover, the first Congress plainly knew how to create 
exclusive federal jurisdiction when it wished to do so. In section 
9 of the 1789 Act, for example, Congress declared that “the dis-
trict courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several 
States, cognizance of [specified federal] crimes and offences.”188 
In section 11 of the 1789 Act, Congress similarly granted the 
circuit courts “exclusive cognizance of [specified federal] crimes 
and offences.”189 If Congress had intended to reject the ordinary 
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction when drafting section 
14’s habeas provisions, it presumably would have used the 
 
(1962) (stating that these principles have “remained unmodified through the 
years”). 
 186. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82. The corresponding 
statute today similarly contains no indication that the federal courts’ jurisdic-
tion over federal prisoners’ habeas claims is exclusive. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 
(West 2006 & Supp. 2007) (“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Su-
preme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge 
within their respective jurisdictions.”). 
 187. Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 479. For example, when Congress 
granted broad federal-question jurisdiction to the federal courts in 1875, Con-
gress certainly did not strip the state courts of their power to adjudicate fed-
eral-question claims. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)). 
 188. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (emphasis added). 
Section 9 expressly specifies other classes of exclusive and concurrent jurisdic-
tion, as well. See id. 
 189. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (emphasis added). 
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same language of exclusivity that it saw fit to use elsewhere in 
the statute. 
2. The Absence of an “Unmistakable Implication from 
Legislative History” 
The 1789 Act’s legislative history does not provide any ba-
sis for drawing an “unmistakable implication”190 that Congress 
wanted federal courts’ jurisdiction over federal prisoners’ ha-
beas claims to be exclusive. The leading histories of the 1789 
Act contain no indication that Congress even discussed the pos-
sibility of giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in 
such cases.191 The Court has made it clear that, when the his-
torical record provides no evidence that Congress considered 
the issue, one is foreclosed from arguing “that Congress unmis-
takably intended to divest state courts of concurrent jurisdic-
tion.”192 In the face of such historical silence, one is not free to 
speculate about what Congress would have done if it had con-
templated the matter.193 
Far from suggesting that Congress wanted to impose limits 
on state courts’ habeas jurisdiction, the historical record makes 
it clear that Congress was at pains to ensure that state courts 
retained a great measure of their power. As is well known, the 
creation of lower federal courts was an issue that deeply di-
vided the delegates to the 1787 Convention in Philadelphia; 
some believed that numerous federal courts would be needed to 
carry out the national government’s judicial business, while 
others were convinced that such courts were unnecessary be-
cause state courts were fully up to the task.194 Ultimately, of 
course, the Constitution’s framers chose to require the creation 
of one federal court—the Supreme Court—and to leave the es-
tablishment of additional, “inferior” federal courts to Congress’s 
discretion.195 After the Constitution was ratified, deep concerns 
persisted concerning the implications of creating a large and 
 
 190. Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 478. 
 191. See GOEBEL, supra note 13, at 457–508; RITZ, supra note 13, passim; 
Holt, supra note 174, at 1478–1517; Warren, supra note 174, passim. 
 192. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1990). 
 193. See id. at 462 (“[E]ven if we could reliably discern what Congress’ in-
tent might have been had it considered the question, we are not at liberty to so 
speculate . . . .”). 
 194. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 174, at 3–4 (recounting this familiar 
history). 
 195. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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powerful federal judiciary.196 Indeed, there were many who had 
readily supported the Constitution who believed that state 
courts should be principally responsible for adjudicating dis-
putes arising under federal law, subject to the Supreme Court’s 
review on appeal.197 As a result, when Congress sat down to 
draft the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was forced to write the sta-
tute in a manner calculated “to secure the votes of those who, 
while willing to see the experiment of a Federal Constitution 
tried, were insistent that the Federal Courts should be given 
the minimum powers and jurisdiction. Its provisions completely 
satisfied no one, though they pleased the Anti-Federalists more 
than the Federalists.”198 
In light of those political dynamics, it is exceedingly diffi-
cult to imagine that the first Congress would have wished to 
limit one of the state courts’ most venerable powers—the power 
to issue the writ of habeas corpus in cases of unlawful deten-
tion. It is frankly impossible to imagine that Congress would 
have wished to strip the state courts of that power when the 
person seeking relief was being extrajudicially detained by offi-
cials representing the new and unproven government about 
which so many felt profound trepidations. 
3. The Absence of a “Clear Incompatibility Between State-
Court Jurisdiction and Federal Interests” 
If there is any hope of justifying the rule declared in Able-
man and Tarble’s Case on grounds of implied preemption, it is 
here, in the consideration of whether allowing state courts to 
award habeas relief to federal prisoners would present a “clear 
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal in-
terests.”199 In its 1981 ruling in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil 
 
 196. See RITZ, supra note 13, at 5. 
 197. See Warren, supra note 174, at 65–66 (providing numerous examples 
of state courts adjudicating disputes under federal law). 
 198. Id. at 53; see Holt, supra note 174, at 1485–87, 1496–97 (noting ways 
in which state courts retained a great deal of power under the 1789 Act). 
 199. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). The 
Court in Tarble’s Case itself asserted that such an incompatibility existed, 
stating that it would undermine the federal government “if its acts could be 
interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another 
sovereignty.” Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409 (1872); see id. at 408–
09 (discussing the incompatibility between the federal power to raise armies 
and the ability of state courts to discharge soldiers). In Ableman, the Court 
also stated that, if the interpretation and enforcement of federal law were left 
entirely to the state courts, “conflicting decisions would unavoidably take 
place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free from 
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Corp.,200 the Court explained that, when determining whether 
such a “clear incompatibility” exists, “[t]he factors generally re-
commending exclusive federal-court jurisdiction . . . include the 
desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal 
judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of 
federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.”201 When one con-
siders those factors—and when one takes into account federal 
officers’ broad power to remove federal prisoners’ state habeas 
petitions to federal court when they deem a state forum inade-
quate—it is apparent that there is no incompatibility sufficient 
to warrant concluding that state courts’ jurisdiction over feder-
al prisoners’ habeas claims has been entirely preempted. 
a. The Federal Government’s Confidence in State Courts’ 
Ability to Adjudicate Federal Constitutional Claims 
State courts routinely adjudicate federal constitutional is-
sues in the cases that come before them. Moreover, as any stu-
dent of the law governing federal habeas relief for state prison-
ers can attest, both the Court and Congress today have a high 
degree of confidence in state judges’ ability to resolve the feder-
al constitutional disputes that ordinarily arise when a person 
claims he or she is being unlawfully detained. The Court has 
“repeatedly and emphatically rejected” the notion that state 
courts are “not competent to adjudicate federal constitutional 
claims.”202 Consider Stone v. Powell, for example, in which the 
Court held that a state prisoner cannot argue, in federal ha-
beas proceedings, that his or her Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when the trial court allowed prosecutors to 
present illegally seized evidence to the jury.203 The Court un-
derscored its confidence in state courts’ ability to adjudicate 
Fourth Amendment claims properly: 
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the 
view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the 
 
. . . local influences.” Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517–18 (1859); 
see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990) (citing this passage for the 
proposition that, when deciding whether state law has been implicitly 
preempted in favor of a federal criminal statute, it is appropriate to consider 
“the need for uniformity and consistency of federal criminal law”). 
 200. 453 U.S. 473 (1981). 
 201. Id. at 483–84. 
 202. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); accord Swain v. Pressley, 430 
U.S. 372, 383 (1977) (asserting that state courts “must be presumed competent 
to decide all issues, including constitutional issues, that routinely arise in the 
trial of criminal cases”). 
 203. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–95 (1976). 
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Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as 
fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitu-
tional rights. . . . Despite differences in institutional environment and 
the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some 
state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. . . . In sum, there is “no in-
trinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make 
him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the 
[consideration of Fourth Amendment claims] than his neighbor in the 
state courthouse.”204 
Congress, too, has manifested a strong measure of confi-
dence in state judges. It has declared, for example, that federal 
courts cannot grant habeas relief to a state prisoner whose 
claims have been “adjudicated on the merits in State court pro-
ceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . was contrary 
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established [Su-
preme Court precedent] or . . . was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.”205 In the ordinary course of events, 
in other words, Congress believes that state courts’ rulings on 
questions of federal constitutional law are sufficiently compe-
tent to preclude federal habeas review. 
To a significant extent, therefore, the Court and Congress 
have set aside any misgivings they may once have had about 
state courts’ ability to adjudicate federal constitutional issues. 
There is thus good reason to believe that allowing state judges 
to adjudicate federal prisoners’ claims of unlawful detention 
would not raise any greater concerns about the uniformity of 
federal law, about state judges’ expertise, or about state judges’ 
hospitality to federal law than already arise when state courts 
adjudicate their own prisoners’ federal constitutional claims.206 
Let us suppose, however, that in a particular prisoner’s 
case, the federal custodian would prefer to litigate in a federal 
forum. Perhaps the custodian does not share the Court’s and 
Congress’s faith in state judges’ abilities. Or perhaps the custo-
 
 204. Id. at 493 n.35 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)). 
 205. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). 
 206. The rights the Constitution confers upon a prisoner do not generally 
depend on whether the prisoner is being held by state or federal officials. See 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 503–
05 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that nearly all of the Bill of Rights’ provisions 
have been deemed applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
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dian favors a federal forum because the prisoner’s case raises 
especially difficult constitutional issues that state judges do not 
routinely confront. If a person is being extrajudicially detained 
as part of the war on terror, for example, the case likely 
presents complex and rarely adjudicated issues involving pres-
idential powers and the rights of “enemy combatants”—issues 
that one might believe federal judges are best suited to ad-
dress.207 Might there then be a “clear incompatibility between 
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests,” such that state 
courts’ jurisdiction should be deemed implicitly preempted?208 
In short, no. Any concerns about such an incompatibility are 
satisfactorily addressed by federal officers’ ability to remove 
state habeas actions to federal court. 
b. Federal Officers’ Removal Power 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century—and at the 
time of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ableman and Tarble’s 
Case—federal officers had only a limited ability to remove civil 
actions brought against them from state to federal court. Early 
Congresses had enacted federal-officer removal legislation on 
several occasions, beginning in 1815, but it had limited those 
statutes’ benefits to federal officials responsible for executing 
the nation’s customs and revenue laws.209 As a result, when a 
federal prisoner filed a habeas action in state court, the federal 
defendant ordinarily had no choice but to litigate in that forum, 
absent the sort of jurisdictional bar that the Court erected 
when Sherman Booth and Edward Tarble tried to secure their 
own freedom. 
It was not until 1887 that Congress gave all defendants the 
right to remove a civil action from state to federal court on the 
ground that the plaintiff ’s claim arose under federal law.210 It 
was not until 1916 that Congress gave members of the federal 
armed forces the power to remove actions brought against them 
 
 207. Cf. supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (noting some of the diffi-
cult issues that the federal courts have adjudicated in recent terrorism-related 
cases). 
 208. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). 
 209. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405–06 (1969) (tracing the 
history of federal-officer removal legislation); FALLON ET AL., supra note 174, 
at 908–09 & n.8 (same). 
 210. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 553. Congress enacted a 
precursor to the 1887 law in 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 
470, 470–71 (granting removal jurisdiction in a wide range of cases, so long as 
the amount in controversy exceeded $500). 
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for acts they performed “under color” of their military authori-
ty.211 And, it was not until 1948 that Congress finally granted 
all federal officers the power to remove actions brought against 
them for acts they performed “under color” of their respective 
offices.212 Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides that, in any civil ac-
tion “of which the district courts of the United States have orig-
inal jurisdiction,” the defendant may remove the action to the 
district court for the district in which the state action is pend-
ing.213 Section 1442a provides that, when an action is brought 
in state court against “a member of the armed forces of the 
United States on account of an act done under color of his office 
or status,” the defendant can remove the action to the federal 
district court for the district where the state action is pend-
ing.214 Section 1442 grants the same broad removal power to 
“any officer (or person acting under that officer) of the United 
States” who is sued for acts performed “under color of such of-
fice.”215 
The plain, overarching purpose of § 1442 and § 1442a is to 
ensure that, when federal officers and members of the military 
find themselves sued in state court for actions performed in the 
course of their official duties, they are able to secure “the pro-
tection of a federal forum.”216 To satisfy the “under color of of-
fice” requirement, the defendant must simply “show a nexus, a 
‘causal connection between the charged [or challenged] conduct 
and asserted official authority.’”217 Moreover, unlike defendants 
seeking to remove pursuant to § 1441—under which actions be-
tween nondiverse parties are removable only if a federal issue 
provides an essential element of the plaintiff ’s well-pleaded 
complaint218—federal officers and members of the military can 
 
 211. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 669. 
 212. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1442, 62 Stat. 869, 938. 
 213. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (stating that, when the district court’s original 
jurisdiction is founded upon the presence of a federal question in the plain-
tiff ’s claims, the action is removable regardless of the place of the defendant’s 
residence, but that diversity cases can only be removed if the defendant is not 
a citizen of the state in which the action was filed). A case can be removed on 
federal question grounds under § 1441 only if federal law provides an essential 
element of the plaintiff ’s cause of action. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 
U.S. 470, 475 (1998). 
 214. 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (2000). 
 215. Id. § 1442(a)(1). 
 216. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). 
 217. Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (quoting Willing-
ham, 395 U.S. at 409). 
 218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See generally Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. 
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remove nondiverse actions to federal court even if the federal 
issue appears only as an element of their defense.219 
Let us return, then, to the case in which federal authorities 
believe that a particular prisoner’s state habeas petition would 
best be litigated in a federal forum. There is no doubt that the 
custodian could remove the action to federal court. If concerns 
about “the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise 
of federal judges in federal law, [or] the assumed greater hospi-
tality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims”220 cause 
federal authorities to prefer to litigate in a federal forum, they 
may easily secure one. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that, when a defendant possesses the power to remove 
an action from state to federal court, “[e]xclusive federal-court 
jurisdiction over [the plaintiff ’s] cause of action generally is 
unnecessary to protect the parties.”221 Consequently, under the 
usual terms of analysis, there is little reason to conclude that 
Congress has implicitly stripped the state courts of all power to 
hear federal prisoners’ habeas claims. 
The only remaining ground for contending that there is a 
“clear incompatibility” between state-court jurisdiction and 
federal interests arises from the very existence of the state ha-
beas remedy. If a federal custodian removed a state habeas ac-
tion to federal court, he or she would secure all of the benefits 
that flow from having a federal judge decide the case. But the 
case itself would continue to exist—the only thing that would 
change would be the forum in which it was adjudicated.222 As 
Professor Amar has noted with respect to this very scenario, 
the federal court “would be obliged to enforce the vertically-
 
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that an action arises under fed-
eral law within the meaning of federal jurisdictional legislation “only when 
the plaintiff ’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon 
those laws”). 
 219. See Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 431 (“Under the federal[-]officer re-
moval statute, suits against federal officers may be removed despite the non-
federal cast of the complaint; the federal question element is met if the de-
fense depends on federal law.”); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) 
(“[I]t is the raising of a federal question in the officer’s removal petition that 
constitutes the federal law under which the action . . . arises for Art. III pur-
poses.”). 
 220. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483–84 (1981). 
 221. Id. at 483 n.12. 
 222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000) (stating that the defendant must pro-
vide the federal court “with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served 
upon such defendant”); YACKLE, supra note 8, at 138 (noting that removal in-
volves merely the “transfer” of a case from state to federal court). 
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pendent state law habeas remedy.”223 Would the states’ provi-
sion of a habeas remedy be so incompatible with federal inter-
ests that Congress should be deemed to want federal remedies 
to be exclusive? 
Presumably, no such incompatibility would exist if the 
state and federal writs were available to federal prisoners in a 
coextensive range of circumstances. If a prisoner chose to seek 
the state remedy rather than the federal counterpart, the cus-
todian could remove the case to federal court and proceed with 
litigation that was identical—in both forum and substance—to 
the litigation that would have ensued if the prisoner had 
sought the federal remedy. One can easily imagine, however, 
that state and federal lawmakers might have very different 
ideas about when the habeas remedy should be available to 
federal detainees. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, for 
example, Congress has purported to strip courts of the power to 
adjudicate federal habeas petitions filed by aliens whom the 
government has designated “enemy combatants.”224 There 
might be other situations, too, in which Congress wishes to re-
strict the federal writ’s availability for federal detainees. Sup-
pose that, in contrast, state judges and lawmakers remain 
more generous. Wouldn’t there then be an incompatibility be-
tween the state habeas remedy, on the one hand, and the fed-
eral interests that prompted Congress to reduce the availability 
of the federal writ, on the other? 
There would indeed be an incompatibility in that circums-
tance—an incompatibility that the Constitution’s framers fore-
saw and addressed. Through the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause,225 the founding generation tried to ensure that Con-
gress could not prevent the states from providing the habeas 
remedy to federal extrajudicial detainees. 
 
 223. Amar, supra note 173, at 1510; cf. Alexander, supra note 5, at 277 
(stating that, while the Constitution and federal law provide the governing 
law, the writ of habeas corpus provides the cause of action that serves as “the 
vehicle for getting into court”). 
 224. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (to be codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(e)) (establishing a system of military commissions and declaring 
that no court shall have jurisdiction over a habeas petition filed by an alien 
being held by the United States as an “enemy combatant”). 
 225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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III.  RESTORING THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE  
TO ITS ROOTS   
Recognizing that there might be occasions when federal 
leaders would find state habeas remedies inconvenient, and 
wishing to ensure that federal leaders could not easily sweep 
those remedies aside, the founding generation ratified the Sus-
pension Clause. The Suspension Clause was aimed at guaran-
teeing citizens and state officials alike that, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, federal leaders could not strip the states of 
their power to provide habeas relief to persons being extrajudi-
cially detained by federal authorities. 
A. PROTECTING THE WRIT “AS IT EXISTED IN 1789” 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states: “The Privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, un-
less when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”226 Like so many other seemingly straightfor-
ward constitutional texts, the Suspension Clause has long been 
regarded as a provision “fraught with confusion.”227 The Su-
preme Court and scholars have largely agreed, however, on at 
least one important premise: “[A]t the absolute minimum, the 
Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’”228 
When determining the scope of the clause’s protections, there-
fore, the core inquiry is decidedly historical in nature.229 Al-
though such matters can perhaps never be resolved beyond all 
possible dispute, the historical record provides strong support 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Note, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 1038, 1263 (1970). 
 228. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 
U.S. 651, 664 (1996)). 
 229. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 170 (1970) (“It can scarcely be 
doubted that the writ protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known 
to the framers . . . .”); David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and De-
tention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 65 (2006) (“At the very 
least, the term [‘habeas corpus’ in the Suspension Clause] appears to carry 
with it whatever comprised the general understanding of the writ at the time 
the Suspension Clause was adopted.”). Justices Scalia and Thomas disagree, 
believing that the clause “does not guarantee any content to (or even the exis-
tence of ) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not 
(except in cases of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). They concede, however, that if the clause does 
serve “as a guarantee of habeas relief,” what it guarantees is “the common-law 
right of habeas corpus, as it was understood when the Constitution was rati-
fied.” Id. at 341–42. 
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for three propositions that are particularly relevant here. First, 
the framers believed the Suspension Clause would safeguard 
state courts’ ability to provide habeas relief to federal detai-
nees. Second, the framers believed that the primary beneficia-
ries of that relief would be individuals detained by federal ex-
ecutive officials without judicial authority. Third, the framers 
believed that, when appropriate, state courts would provide the 
writ to citizens and noncitizens alike. The historical record also 
provides moderate support for a fourth proposition—namely, 
that the common law in 1789 authorized a state court to issue 
the writ even when the petitioner was detained outside of the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction, so long as the court could reach 
the petitioner’s custodian with service of process. 
1. State Habeas Relief for Federal Detainees 
In his groundbreaking examination of the writ of habeas 
corpus in early American history, William Duker convincingly 
argues that 
the debates in the federal and state conventions, the location of the 
habeas clause [in Section 9 of Article I, which in several instances 
imposes limits on Congress’s power with respect to the states], and 
the contemporary commentary support the thesis that the habeas 
clause was designed to restrict Congressional power to suspend state 
habeas [relief ] for federal prisoners.230 
Proponents of the Suspension Clause were greatly con-
cerned about the possibility that leaders of the new national 
government would violate individuals’ liberties and then try to 
block state courts’ efforts to do something about it.231 By limit-
ing Congress’s ability to suspend state courts’ power to award 
the writ to federal detainees, the Suspension Clause was in-
tended to place an important check on federal officials’ ability 
to imprison individuals unlawfully. 
Numerous scholars agree that the framers’ primary objec-
tive was to protect state courts’ ability to come to the aid of fed-
eral prisoners. Professor Amar concludes, for example, that 
Duker “has established that the very purpose of the habeas 
non-suspension clause . . . was to protect the remedy of state 
 
 230. DUKER, supra note 3, at 135. Duker points out, for example, that Al-
exander Hamilton assured the people of New York that the “habeas corpus 
act” would serve as an important safeguard of individual liberties under the 
new government—an apparent reference to New York’s recently enacted ha-
beas statute. See id. at 132–33; THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamil-
ton), supra note 179, at 467.  
 231. See DUKER, supra note 3, at 129. 
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habeas from being abrogated by the federal government; the 
language of non-suspension obviously presupposes a pre-
existing (state) common law habeas remedy.”232 Eric Freedman 
writes that “it would be anachronistic to assume that the [par-
ticipants in the ratification debates] shared the view of the ni-
neteenth-century Supreme Court that state courts could not is-
sue the writ to federal prisoners.”233 Rex Collings posits that 
the reason the delegates to the 1787 Convention did not affir-
matively grant federal courts the power to issue the writ of ha-
beas corpus—but rather limited the occasions on which Con-
gress could suspend it—was that “the states had sufficiently 
provided for the writ [and so] protection would be unnecessary 
in the new Constitution other than against arbitrary suspen-
sion.”234 Daniel Meador similarly argues that, in the eyes of the 
Constitution’s framers, it was unnecessary to draft a provision 
granting federal courts the power to issue habeas relief to fed-
eral prisoners, because the states already afforded that protec-
tion to “any person imprisoned anywhere within the States of 
the Union.”235 Gerald Neuman notes that, for those who would 
interpret the Constitution in accordance with its likely original 
intent, “the U.S. constitutional system has been in flagrant vi-
olation of the Suspension Clause for more than two-thirds of its 
history,”236 ever since the Supreme Court dubiously declared in 
Ableman237 and Tarble’s Case238 that state courts are constitu-
tionally barred from ordering a federal prisoner released.239 
 
 232. Amar, supra note 173, at 1509. As Professor Amar reads the framers’ 
intentions, “[t]he common law would furnish the cause of action that assured 
judicial review; the Constitution would furnish the test on the legal merits of 
confinement.” Id. at 1510. 
 233. Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 
44 BUFF. L. REV. 451, 458 (1996). 
 234. Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional 
Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 345 (1952). 
 235. DANIEL J. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF 
POWER AND LIBERTY 33 (1966). Meador writes that political leaders in 1787 
had “little reason” to suspect that the Court would one day declare that state 
courts lacked jurisdiction to award habeas relief to federal detainees. See id. 
 236. Neuman, supra note 10, at 596. 
 237. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 523 (1859) (acknowledging a 
state court’s authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus within its territorial 
limits, but declaring that once “the State judge or court [is] judicially apprised 
that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can 
proceed no further”). 
 238. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 410–11 (1872). 
 239. See supra notes 87–110, 129–66 and accompanying text. 
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Much of the confusion surrounding the Suspension Clause 
today stems from the very fact that in Ableman and Tarble’s 
Case the Court severed the clause from its original meaning, 
thereby making the text that much more difficult to interp-
ret.240 Proving that even our most revered jurists sometimes 
point the law in unfortunate directions, Chief Justice John 
Marshall abetted the Court’s eventual abandonment of the 
Suspension Clause’s roots. Writing for the Court in Ex parte 
Bollman,241 Chief Justice Marshall sought to explain section 14 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave federal courts the pow-
er to award habeas relief to federal prisoners.242 He stated that, 
in light of the “injunction” laid down in the Suspension Clause, 
the first Congress “must have felt, with peculiar force, the obli-
gation of providing efficient means by which this great consti-
tutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the 
means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, al-
though no law for its suspension should be enacted.”243 Chief 
Justice Marshall said nothing about the fact that state courts 
already held the power to award the writ and that federal legis-
lation was thus not necessary to give the Suspension Clause 
meaning. Perhaps the staunch Federalist was reluctant to ac-
knowledge one of the important ways in which those fearful of 
the new national government had hoped to keep that govern-
ment in check. 
Regardless of the impetus underlying Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s ill-advised lead, courts and scholars ever since have al-
most invariably assumed that the Suspension Clause’s chief 
function is to place limits on Congress’s ability to suspend the 
federal writ—a focus that the Court locked firmly into place (at 
least with respect to federal prisoners) when it forced state 
courts entirely off the playing field in Ableman and Tarble’s 
Case.244 The fact remains, however, that many in the founding 
generation believed the Suspension Clause’s primary purpose 
was to ensure that—absent a “Rebellion” or “Invasion” necessi-
tating its suspension245—the state habeas remedy would re-
main available to persons unlawfully held in federal custody. 
 
 240. See supra notes 87–166 and accompanying text. 
 241. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
 242. See id. at 94–95. 
 243. Id. at 95. 
 244. See DUKER, supra note 3, at 126 (“Since Ex parte Bollman, it has gen-
erally been accepted that the intent of the habeas clause was somehow to 
guarantee a federal writ of habeas corpus.”). 
 245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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2. State Habeas Relief for Persons Being Extrajudicially 
Detained 
Americans today are most familiar with the writ of habeas 
corpus as a device by which individuals can collaterally chal-
lenge their criminal convictions.246 Habeas’s use as a means of 
providing postconviction relief, however, is a comparatively 
modern phenomenon, set in motion by Congress’s decision to 
broaden the federal writ’s availability in the wake of the Civil 
War.247 The primary historic purpose of the habeas writ was “to 
test the legality of executive detention not authorized by any 
court”248—or, as one scholar puts it, “to ensure that executive 
officials will not be left to determine the scope of their own au-
thority to arrest and detain individuals.”249 Daniel Meador ex-
plains the concern: 
Detention by executive authority . . . poses the oldest and perhaps the 
greatest threat to liberty under law. For, by hypothesis, there is in-
carceration with no judicial determination of anything. Since the de-
privation of liberty has not been subjected to the scrutiny of a court, it 
lacks that assurance of legality which has come to be thought of as 
integral to government under law.250 
 
 246. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 174, at 838 (“[F]ederal courts have 
the authority to review state court criminal convictions pursuant to writs of 
habeas corpus.”). 
 247. See Collings, supra note 234, at 353. In 1867, Congress gave federal 
courts the broad power to award habeas relief to all persons held in custody in 
violation of federal law. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–
86. Prior to that time, courts generally followed the common-law rule that “a 
judgment of conviction rendered by a court of general criminal jurisdiction was 
conclusive proof that confinement was legal. Such a judgment prevented is-
suance of the writ without more.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211 
(1952); accord Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 207 (1830) (“The judg-
ment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of its own legal-
ity, and requires for its support no inspection of the indictments on which it is 
founded.”). The 1867 Act changed the law, allowing federal courts to award 
habeas relief to persons whose criminal convictions had become final. See 
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996) (“[I]t was not until well into [the 
twentieth] century that this Court interpreted [the 1867 Act] to allow a final 
judgment of conviction in a state court to be collaterally attacked on habeas.”); 
see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Re-
moval of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 982–85 (1998) (discussing the Court’s 
shift from Ex parte Watkins to the modern era). 
 248. FALLON ET AL., supra note 174, at 1290; accord Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The historic purpose of the 
writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial tri-
al.”). 
 249. Neuman, supra note 247, at 1022. 
 250. MEADOR, supra note 235, at 38. 
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The Supreme Court has strongly acknowledged habeas’s 
role as the primary remedy for extrajudicial confinement: “At 
its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a 
means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is 
in that context that its protections have been strongest.”251 
The writ of habeas corpus was assigned this critical func-
tion long before the delegates to the 1787 Convention drafted a 
new national charter. England’s landmark Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1679252 focused almost entirely on the need to provide relief 
to those individuals who were being held on criminal charges 
indefinitely, without judicial process.253 The remedy provided 
by the Act was either bail (if the crime charged was a misde-
meanor) or an order that the person be brought quickly to trial 
(if the crime charged was a felony).254 Once a prisoner had fi-
nally become the object of judicial proceedings, English courts 
generally refused to issue the writ.255 
The 1679 Act, with its strong focus on extrajudicial deten-
tions, provided the blueprint for nearly all of the states’ early 
habeas laws, both before and after 1789.256 By the time the ear-
 
 251. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 179, at 480 (praising the writ of habeas cor-
pus for providing relief from the “fatal evil” of “arbitrary imprisonments”); Ri-
chard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1779 n.244 (1991) (stating 
that the Suspension Clause “is most plausibly understood as extending only to 
cases of extrajudicial detention by federal authority, and thus does not guar-
antee a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners”). 
 252. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.). 
 253. See MEADOR, supra note 235, at 26–27 (explaining that the 1679 Act 
was primarily concerned with pretrial extrajudicial detentions and that such 
detentions “had been the burning issue for over half a century”). 
 254. See Collings, supra note 234, at 337 (explaining the various remedies). 
Dallin Oaks explains: 
At common law and under the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 the 
use of the Great Writ against official restraints was simply to ensure 
that a person was not held without formal charges and that once 
charged he was either bailed or brought to trial within a specified 
time. If a prisoner was held by a valid warrant or pursuant to the ex-
ecution or judgment of a proper court, he could not obtain release by 
habeas corpus. 
Oaks, supra note 23, at 244–45. 
 255. See Collings, supra note 234, at 337 (“In practice the writ was general-
ly not granted where the party was in execution on a criminal charge after in-
dictment according to the course of the common law.”). 
 256. See id. at 338 (“State legislatures before and after the 1789 constitu-
tional convention copied the Act of 1679 as their basic habeas corpus sta-
tute.”); Oaks, supra note 23, at 252–53 (stating that, with the lone exception of 
Connecticut, all of the early states patterned their habeas legislation after the 
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ly Americans ratified their new Constitution, therefore, the 
writ of habeas corpus had been firmly assigned its central task: 
to provide relief to those being detained by the executive with-
out judicial process. In the eyes of many of those who ratified it 
in 1789, the Suspension Clause guaranteed that, absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, Congress could not terminate state 
courts’ ability to bring individuals’ extrajudicial detention to an 
end.257 
3. State Habeas Relief for Citizens and Noncitizens Alike 
Both prior to and after the Constitution’s ratification in 
1789, the common-law writ of habeas corpus was widely un-
derstood to be available to citizens and noncitizens alike.258 As 
Gerald Neuman observes, “[i]n England [the writ] was not li-
mited to subjects, and in the United States it was not limited to 
citizens.”259 As Part I indicates, for example, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court ordered a Russian boy released from 
the army after concluding that the child was too young to enlist 
and was not sufficiently fluent in English to understand the 
oath that army officials had administered to him.260 A member 
of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature similarly took 
jurisdiction of a habeas petition filed by a man seeking a dis-
charge from the army on the grounds that he was not an Amer-
ican citizen.261 During wartime, noncitizens within the United 
States admittedly have been granted fewer habeas privileges 
than American citizens if the aliens’ citizenship rests with the 
nation with which the United States is at war.262 But even 
 
1679 Act); id. at 258–62 (elaborating on the 1679 Act’s use as the early states’ 
primary model). 
 257. See Collings, supra note 234, at 337–45 (arguing that the right pro-
tected by the Suspension Clause is the right to be either brought to trial or set 
free); cf. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 96 (1869) (noting that the 1679 
Act provided the framework for the framers’ understanding of the writ pro-
tected by the Suspension Clause). 
 258. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“In England prior to 
1789, in the Colonies, and in this Nation during the formative years of our 
Government, the writ of habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as 
well as to citizens.”). 
 259. Neuman, supra note 247, at 989; see also id. at 989–1020 (thoroughly 
canvassing federal cases illustrating this principle); Gerald L. Neuman, Juris-
diction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1963, 1966 (2000) (making the same point even concerning enemy aliens). 
 260. See Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 63, 63–66 (1814). 
 261. United States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill 16, 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
 262. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) (stating 
that, when a “resident enemy alien” is seized by the Executive during a de-
 2007] STATE HABEAS RELIEF 315 
 
those resident enemy aliens have been deemed to possess at 
least a limited right of access to the writ.263 
4. State Habeas Relief for Detainees Held Beyond the Court’s 
Territorial Jurisdiction 
Ordinarily, a prisoner and his or her custodian reside with-
in the same locale, and so a court need not wrestle with the 
question of whether it can issue the writ when one of the par-
ties is located beyond the court’s jurisdictional reach.264 When 
the federal government extrajudicially confines individuals 
within the United States, for example—as when it recently 
held Jose Padilla at a navy brig in South Carolina for several 
years265—both the prisoner and the custodian are likely to be 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the same state court. A 
 
clared war and is held for deportation pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act, a 
court will consider “his plea for freedom . . . only to ascertain the existence of a 
state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien 
Enemy Act”); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948) (using the same 
standard as Eisentrager). Under the Alien Enemy Act, the president has the 
authority, when the United States is in the midst of a declared war or when it 
has been invaded by a foreign government, to deport individuals fourteen-
years of age and older who are citizens of the hostile nation. See Act of July 6, 
1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000)). 
 263. See supra note 262. Enemy aliens who have never entered the United 
States, however, might not have any constitutional claim of entitlement to the 
habeas writ. In 1950, the Court wrote: 
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country 
where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy 
who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been 
within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the Constitu-
tion extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768. In 2004, the Supreme Court held, as a matter of 
federal statutory interpretation, that nonresident enemy aliens can invoke a 
federal court’s habeas jurisdiction, so long as the court can reach the federal 
custodian with service of process. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478–84 
(2004) (recognizing at least limited statutory habeas rights for detainees held 
by federal military authorities at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba). It is 
not clear whether, absent such legislation, nonresident enemy aliens could 
claim a constitutional entitlement to the writ. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 
S. Ct. 2749, 2818 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reaching a constitutional issue 
not addressed by the majority and concluding that, under Eisentrager, “peti-
tioner, an enemy alien detained abroad, has no rights under the Suspension 
Clause”). 
 264. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 444 (2004) (“In habeas chal-
lenges to present physical confinement . . . the district of confinement is syn-
onymous with the district court that has territorial jurisdiction over the prop-
er respondent. . . . By definition, the immediate custodian and the prisoner 
reside in the same district.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 265. Id. at 430–32. 
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more difficult scenario arises, however, when the federal gov-
ernment detains individuals outside the fifty states, whether at 
the Guantanamo Naval Base or elsewhere.266 Under the law 
governing the habeas writ in 1789, could a person confined 
beyond the nation’s borders nevertheless seek habeas relief 
from a state court, so long as the court could reach the detai-
nee’s custodian with service of process? Answering that ques-
tion is difficult because that rare circumstance did not fre-
quently arise in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.267 
However, it seems likely that one should answer it in the af-
firmative. 
In Ex parte Graham, decided in 1818, the Circuit Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that it is “essential 
to the exercise of . . . jurisdiction by any particular court, that 
the person or thing against whom or which the court proceeds, 
should be within the local jurisdiction of such court.”268 Twen-
ty-two years later, in United States v. Davis, the Circuit Court 
for the District of Columbia held that, so long as the custodian 
was within its jurisdiction, it could issue the writ on behalf of 
persons located elsewhere.269 That court issued the writ against 
Thomas Davis, a slaveholder, commanding him to bring three 
slaves to court for a hearing concerning their freedom. Davis 
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the three 
slaves were being held in other parts of the country.270 The 
court rejected that argument, concluding that Davis was ob-
liged to obey the writ so long as he held the power to produce 
 
 266. As a matter of statutory interpretation concerning the federal writ, 
the Court has said that the prisoner need not be present in the jurisdiction of 
the court issuing the writ—all that is essential is that the court be able to 
reach the prisoner’s custodian with service of process. See Braden v. 30th 
Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–500 (1973). Citing statutory 
developments, Braden rejected the course charted in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 
188 (1948), in which the Court had held that, under the governing federal sta-
tute, the petitioner had to be located within the jurisdiction of the federal 
court issuing the writ. Braden, 410 U.S. at 495–99; see also Ahrens, 335 U.S. 
at 191 (“It would take compelling reasons to conclude that Congress contem-
plated the production of prisoners from remote sections, perhaps thousands of 
miles from the District Court that issued the writ.”). 
 267. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1000–01 (D.C. Cir.) (Rogers, 
J., dissenting) (noting “[t]he paucity of direct [historical] precedent” in this 
area), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). 
 268. Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911, 913 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5657) 
(emphasis added). 
 269. United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 775, 775–76 (C.C.D.C. 1840) (No. 
14,926). 
 270. Id. at 775. 
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the slaves, regardless of where they were located.271 Taken to-
gether, Graham and Davis indicate that it is only the location 
of the custodian—and not the location of the prisoner—that 
matters when determining a court’s common-law jurisdiction to 
issue the writ. 
The issue arose again in 1867, in a case brought before the 
Supreme Court of Michigan. In In re Jackson, guardians sought 
the writ on behalf of a boy who had been temporarily deposited 
across state lines.272 Justice James Campbell argued that Mich-
igan’s habeas statute did not grant the court the power to act 
when a prisoner was located outside the court’s territorial ju-
risdiction.273 Justice Thomas Cooley construed the Michigan 
statute differently, arguing that it left room for the case to be 
governed by common-law principles.274 With respect to the con-
tent of that common law, he acknowledged that some cases con-
tained language indicating that the petitioner had to be con-
fined within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, but he said that 
those remarks were “of no significance” because none of those 
cases squarely presented the issue for resolution.275 In his 
judgment, only the custodian’s location mattered: 
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure 
upon this writ is, that it is directed to, and served upon, not the per-
son confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except 
through the latter. . . . The whole force of the writ is spent upon the 
[jailor] . . . .276 
Citing Justice Cooley’s opinion, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
reached the same conclusion when it confronted the issue in 
1881, reasoning that, if a custodian had earlier removed a pris-
oner from a state court’s jurisdiction, he or she could just as 
easily bring the prisoner back in compliance with the writ.277 
The United States Supreme Court later cited Justice Cooley’s 
reasoning with approval.278 
 
 271. Id. at 775–76. 
 272. In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, 420 (1867). 
 273. See id. at 422 (Campbell, J.). 
 274. See id. at 438–39 (Cooley, J.). 
 275. Id. at 441 (Cooley, J.). 
 276. Id. at 439–40 (Cooley, J.); cf. JAMES A. SCOTT & CHARLES C. ROE, THE 
LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 129 (1923) (citing English precedent and stating “[n]o 
court has any authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus directed to a person 
outside of its territorial jurisdiction”). 
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There is thus good reason to believe that the state-court 
power protected by the Suspension Clause is the power to issue 
the writ on behalf of any extrajudicial detainee—regardless of 
where he or she is located—so long as the prisoner’s custodian 
is within the court’s jurisdictional reach.279 If the custodian re-
sponsible for the detainees at the Guantanamo Naval Base re-
turned home for a visit, for example, he or she could find a 
state court’s service of process following not far behind. 
B. REDISCOVERING THE ROLE OF THE STATES 
If one ignores the Suspension Clause’s original purpose, 
one can perhaps be forgiven for declaring that state courts’ 
practice of granting habeas relief to federal extrajudicial detai-
nees throughout the first half of the nineteenth century was 
based upon an “extravagant” notion of states’ rights.280 But 
that characterization cannot be reconciled with the founding 
generation’s understanding of the Constitution’s text. Indeed, 
the original understanding of the Suspension Clause is mani-
fested by the very fact that, for half a century, state courts rou-
tinely took jurisdiction of habeas petitions filed by persons be-
ing extrajudicially detained by federal authorities, and federal 
officials readily obeyed the state courts’ orders.281 State courts 
were doing nothing more than what the Suspension Clause 
preserved for them the right to do. 
For the state judges who exercised it, the power protected 
by the Suspension Clause was far from superfluous. The states’ 
ability to come to the aid of a person illegally and extrajudicial-
ly detained lay at the very heart of what it meant to be a sove-
reign. No less an authority than Chief Justice Kent insisted in 
1813 that it was his court’s “indispensable duty . . . and one to 
which every inferior consideration must be sacrificed, to act as 
a faithful guardian of the personal liberty of the citizen,” even 
when the citizen was in federal custody.282 Justice Southard, of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, declared in 1819 that a state 
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court’s ability to provide relief in such cases was “relat[ed] to 
the highest duty of a government, to the proudest attribute of 
sovereignty.”283 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote in 
1847 that “the power of the judiciary in this state is adequate 
to crumble . . . to dust” the chains of a citizen’s captivity, “no 
matter where or how the chains . . . were forged.”284 Rollin 
Hurd, one of the leading nineteenth-century commentators on 
the habeas remedy,285 insisted that “[a] sovereign state has a 
right to be informed why any of her citizens are imprisoned, 
simply because it is her duty to set them free from all illegal 
imprisonment.”286 
Although it ventured into troublesome territory when it is-
sued the writ for a person who had already been tried, con-
victed, and sentenced in a federal court, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Ableman was thus drawing inspiration from a 
venerable tradition.287 That court explained that, if it could not 
order a person within its jurisdiction released from unlawful 
federal custody, “the state would be stripped of one of the most 
essential attributes of sovereignty, and would present the spec-
tacle of a state claiming the allegiance of its citizens, without 
the power to protect them in the enjoyment of their personal 
liberty upon its own soil.”288 In the eyes of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, it was crucial that the state judiciary hold “the 
power to grant that relief which all governments owe to those 
from whom they claim obedience.”289 Although likely misap-
plied when used to justify freeing a man who was incarcerated 
pursuant to the judgment of a federal court, the argument itself 
was deeply rooted. 
It was an argument, moreover, that the framers would 
have readily appreciated. The framers believed there was a di-
rect correlation between a sovereign’s ability to serve its consti-
tuents and its ability to retain those constituents’ trust, loyalty, 
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and obedience.290 Alexander Hamilton argued, for example, 
that the state and federal governments could each instill in cit-
izens an “habitual sense of obligation” only if they were each 
able to govern in a manner calculated to earn citizens’ “affec-
tion, esteem, and reverence.”291 It was by “attract[ing] to its 
support those passions which have the strongest influence upon 
the human heart,” Hamilton believed, that a government could 
secure the people’s compliance with its laws without resort to 
force.292 Arguing in a similar vein, James Madison predicted 
that the states would retain a powerful claim to citizens’ loyalty 
because the states’ powers would “extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liber-
ties, and properties of the people.”293 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, like so many courts before 
it, believed that the states’ credibility as a sovereign was per-
haps nowhere more publicly tested than when asked to free a 
citizen from unlawful confinement. These courts feared that, if 
the states were powerless to provide relief from illegal extra-
judicial detention, citizens would grow to feel less attached to 
their states, would grow to feel less respect for state authori-
ties, and would eventually allow power to be concentrated in 
the hands of the government they deemed more powerful and 
better able to serve them.294 
Viewed from that perspective, the presumption in favor of 
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over claims arising 
under federal law takes on special importance.295 Unless Con-
gress clearly expresses its desire to make federal jurisdiction 
exclusive, it is vital that the state courts, like their federal 
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counterparts, remain able to provide citizens with the appro-
priate remedies when their rights are violated. Handling the 
people’s judicial business is one of the ways in which the states 
are able to ensure that citizens continue to perceive them as vi-
able sovereigns. To infer too quickly that Congress has pushed 
the states aside would thus undermine the states’ effort to re-
tain a meaningful place in the dual-sovereign system of gov-
ernment that the Constitution’s framers devised.296 
When it comes to providing habeas relief for federal extra-
judicial detainees, therefore, it is not sufficient to say that, be-
cause Congress has authorized the federal courts to adjudicate 
federal prisoners’ habeas claims,297 there is no need to enlist 
the aid of the state courts. It is not a matter merely of distri-
buting the workload, nor is it a matter merely of ensuring that 
at least one sovereign’s courts are authorized to issue the writ. 
It is a matter of giving both state and federal judges an oppor-
tunity to earn the people’s loyalty and trust by providing indi-
viduals with assistance when they are most profoundly in need 
of a court’s help. The Suspension Clause guaranteed the states 
that they would not be stripped of that power except in the  
direst of circumstances. It is not too late to honor the Constitu-
tion’s promise. 
  CONCLUSION   
Many today may find it difficult to contemplate a world in 
which state courts could grant habeas relief to individuals be-
ing detained by the federal government without judicial au-
thority.298 Therein lies an irony. In the nineteenth century, 
state courts believed that, in order to maintain the trust and 
respect of the citizenry, it was essential that they remain able 
to come to the aid of individuals being extrajudicially impri-
soned by federal authorities. It has been nearly a century and a 
half since the Supreme Court put the state courts out of the 
business of adjudicating federal detainees’ habeas petitions, 
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and so it has been a very long time indeed since Americans 
have looked to the state courts as the primary protector of their 
freedom. We thus now find ourselves struggling to imagine 
state courts doing the very thing that state courts once believed 
they must be able to do in order to maintain our trust. 
For more than half a century, however, state courts 
wielded the power to free individuals from federal extrajudicial 
confinement. With few exceptions, it was a power that state 
courts exercised to the apparent satisfaction of citizens and 
federal officials alike.299 When it stripped state courts of that 
power, the Supreme Court offered a dubious constitutional ra-
tionale that scholars today discredit with apparent unanimi-
ty.300 Yet the implied-preemption argument that scholars have 
used to rationalize the Court’s actions does not fare any bet-
ter.301 Congress has not taken any steps to reject the presump-
tion that state and federal courts are equally competent to take 
jurisdiction of individuals’ claims that they are being extrajudi-
cially confined by federal authorities in violation of federal 
law.302 Moreover, for those occasions when federal custodians 
would prefer to litigate such claims in a federal forum, the re-
moval statutes that have been on the books since the mid-
1900s give federal officials ample power to remove the detai-
nees’ claims from state to federal court.303 Finally, and most 
significantly, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause assures cit-
izens and the states that Congress cannot strip state courts of 
their power to adjudicate federal extrajudicial detainees’ ha-
beas claims except “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”304 
At its core, the Suspension Clause assures the states that 
they will remain a primary guardian of individuals’ freedom, 
even when federal authorities are the ones posing the threat.305 
Neither the Court nor scholars have identified any persuasive 
rationale for concluding that the Constitution’s promise is one 
we may ignore. It is time to allow state courts to leave their 
seats on the sidelines and get back into the game. 
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